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ABSTRACT
In 2002, US Navy Seals found a list of pathogens in an Afghanistan cave that Al Qaeda had
planned to use in a series of biological attacks. Unique about the discovery was that the
pathogens were not limited to human ones. Six pathogens targeted livestock and four targeted
crops. Despite this discovery, limited attention has been given to the possibility of a statesponsored terrorist attack utilizing biological agents against the US population, food source, or
water supply. Throughout history, biological agents have been developed for use as an offensive
weapon for both states and terrorist groups. The United States may soon see a successful
biological attack by a state or nonstate actor against its troops in the Middle East, the Asia
Pacific, or its homeland population and agricultural industry. While it is unlikely that such
attacks will occur from traditional terrorist groups, it is possible that a state with a biological
weapons program will sponsor a biological terrorist attack as a way of progressing its interests
against the United States. This thesis provides a background for understanding biological attacks
and examines the threat of a state-sponsored biological terrorist attack against the United States
and its assets abroad, what the impact would be, possible scenarios for an attack, and policy
recommendations to preventing and containing a futuristic attack.

KEYWORDS: biological weapons, pathogens, terrorism, state-sponsors, agriculture,
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The news only got worse the longer you watched it. Hundreds were dead and many more
on their death beds, suffering from the plague. It had taken everyone by surprise when just two
weeks ago a soldier deployed in the Middle East fell ill with symptoms resembling the modern
flu. Just yesterday, entire regiments of soldiers abroad were reporting widespread sickness, and
military hospitals were overrun. Upon closer examination of the disease, it was found out that the
flu was not the culprit at all; the disease ravaging the United States military abroad was the
Bubonic Plague. The suddenness and the seemingly unexplained onset of the disease left the
world puzzled, and rumors began to spread about the possibility of a pointed and intentional
attack against American military assets in the Middle East being the culprit. Then, everything got
worse. Ten days after the first death was recorded, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the
attack. The world was shocked. How could one terrorist organization obtain and weaponize such
deadly pathogens? It turns out they were not working alone. While this scenario sounds like
something out of the latest sci-fi movie, it is also set in reality. Every day the likelihood that a
terrorist organization plans and executes a biological attack against American assets at home and
abroad increases.
Biological warfare is not a new concept, but rather as old as war itself. The first recorded
use of pathogens as weapons was in 14th century B.C.E. when the Hittites sent rams infected with
Tularemia to their Arzawan enemies to spread disease and ravage the population. 1 Since then,
Eastern and Western nations alike have used biological agents to tip the odds in their favor.

1. Siro Igino Trevisanato, “The ‘Hittite Plague’ an Epidemic of Tularemia and the First
Record of Biological Warfare,” Medical Hypotheses 69, no. 6 (2007): 1374

1

In the Middle Ages, military leaders did not weaponize the disease but rather the carrier
by using the corpses of infected people as weapons of mass destruction. During the siege of
Caffa, the military leaders of Tartar used the epidemic to their favor by “hurling the cadavers of
their deceased into the city… forcing a retreat of the Genoese forces.” 2 In the 15th century, it was
said that Francisco Pizarro and Sir Jeffrey Amherst intentionally provided Native Americans
with smallpox-laden blankets in hopes that the disease would spread and decrease the chance of
Native American hostility toward the British. 3
During the Civil War, confederates would sell the clothing of yellow fever victims to
Union soldiers as a war strategy for defeating forces. 4 In the time since the Civil War, there have
also been reports of biological agents being used during the First World War, the Second World
War, and more recently after September 11, 2001, with the Anthrax Letters.
As technology advanced, so did people’s methods for transferring diseases. Infected
corpses turned into powdered pathogens, and smallpox blankets turned into bombs filled with
fleas. The world watched in fear as nations globally developed and experimented with the same
bacteria and viruses that caused the deaths of 25 million people during the Black Death, 5 300

2. Stefan Riedel, “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review,” Baylor
University Medical Center Proceedings 17, no. 4 (2004): 402.
3. George W. Christopher et al. “Biological Warfare. A Historical Perspective,” JAMA
278, no. 5 (1997): 414.
4. Jacob Roberts, “Yellow Fever Fiend,” Science History Institute, 2014,
https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/magazine/yellow-fever-fiend.
5. “Plague,” National Geographic, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/healthand-human-body/human-diseases/the-plague/, (accessed November 14, 2018).
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million during the smallpox pandemic, 6 and up to 50 million during the Spanish Flu pandemic of
1918. 7 What was once a rudimentary hit-or-miss bomb was being refined to more closely
resemble precision-guided munitions.
Today, biological agents remain a lesser known, but no less powerful form of warfare, a
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) that is limitless. Despite the devastating potential of
biological weapons, terrorist organizations have yet to acquire, weaponize, or utilize biological
weapons against their enemies. This is not for lack of trying. In 2002, American marines
discovered documents in Al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of eastern Afghanistan that
documented United States’ agriculture, trained Al-Qaeda operatives in targeting agriculture, and
contained schematics on possible bioweapons including six human pathogens, six targeting
livestock and poultry, and four targeting crops. 8 However, the expertise needed to create or
weaponize diseases to the sophistication needed to pull off a widescale attack likely exceeds
what most terrorist organizations have access to currently. This means that terrorists wishing to
utilize weapons would need the help of a state that possesses a biological weapons program to
supply them with the pathogens needed. In this way, state-sponsored biological terrorism could
become a terrifying reality.
Despite global condemnation for terrorist organizations, the link between states and
terrorist organizations is not obsolete. As recently as October 2018, it was reported that Iran was

6. Colette Flight, “Smallpox: Eradicating the Scourge,” BBC, February 07, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/smallpox_01.shtml#one.
7. John M. Barry, “How the Horrific 1918 Fly Spread Across America,” Smithsonian
Magazine, November 2017, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/journal-plague-year180965222/.
8. Dean Olson, “U.S. Agriculture Represents a Large and Viable Terrorist Target,” FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin 81, no. 2 (2012): 1.
3

utilizing civilian planes to transfer weapons to the terrorist organization Hezbollah. The report
quoted a regional intelligence source as saying, “The Iranians are trying to come up with new
ways and routes to smuggle weapons from Iran to its allies in the Middle East, testing and
defying the West’s abilities to track them down.” 9 Nations already provide missiles, drones, and
other weapons to terrorist organizations; it is not outrageous to predict that biological weapons
could be next.
This possible advance in terrorism may spell danger for the United States. Biological
weapons can devastate populations, destroy livestock, ravage crops, and contaminate sources of
water. The foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in the United Kingdom destroyed an estimated two
million animals and cost the United Kingdom an accumulated six billion Euros in losses. 10 In
Ireland, the Great Famine, now known to be caused by a mold that destroys the edible parts of
the potato plant caused the deaths of nearly one million people and forced millions of others to
leave their homes. 11 The cholera epidemic, in New York City, spread by contaminated water,
killed nearly 3% of the population. 12 A biological attack against the United States will not go
unnoticed and has the potential to devastate its resources and prevent economic growth.

9. “Iran Smuggling Weapons to Hezbollah via Civilian Airline, Report Says,” Haaretz,
September 04, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-smuggling-weaponsto-hezbollah-via-civilian-airline-report-says-1.6445481.
10. Francisco Sobrino and Esteban Domingo, “Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Europe,”
EMBO Reports 2, no. 6 (2001): 460.
11. Joel Mokyr, “Great Famine,” Britannica Encyclopedia,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Great-Famine-Irish-history (accessed November 12, 2018).
12. John Noble Wilford, “How Epidemics Helped Shape the Modern Metropolis,” The
New York Times, April 15, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/science/15chol.html.
4

Despite this potential for devastation, it is important to note that biological weapons, like
other WMD, remain part of this cache of weapons
This thesis will go through the possibility of a state-sponsored biological attack on United
States’ assets both at home and abroad, by providing a background on potential biological
agents, examining the aggressors of a potential attack, and indicating areas where the United
States can improve its defenses against biological attacks. This thesis is not meant to identify the
potential for a biological attack on the United States by other nation-states, but rather explore the
possibility that those nation-states will provide terrorist organizations with biological agents to
use at their discretion.
To this end, Chapter II will explore the potential agents that can be used during biological
attacks. This chapter is necessary to provide the reader with background information on the
pathogens that will be mentioned later in the paper. This chapter is not meant to be a scientific
analysis of each pathogen, but rather a layman explanation in how the disease spreads, who and
what it affects, its potential for devastation, and which countries have easy access to the
pathogens. This chapter will cover multiple pathogens that have human targets, agents that affect
livestock, germs affecting crops, and even those that can affect water sources.
Chapter III offers an in-depth analysis of the state-ran biological weapons programs of
five nations. The countries included are the Syrian Arab Republic, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian
Federation, whose program was inherited from the Soviet Union. This chapter is meant to show
what pathogens each program possesses, instances of experimentation, and its capabilities to
weaponize the agent.

5

Chapter IV illustrates a historical timeline for biological incidents and threats of
biological attacks against United States assets. This chapter also gives evidence that proves
biological attacks are not just possible, but probable. It will begin with the first known instance
of biological warfare between the Hittites and the Arzawans nearly 3,500 years ago and end with
an in-depth look at more recent findings that indicate terrorists are planning for a future
involving biological weapons.
Chapter V will offer sound definitions of biological terrorism (bioterrorism), agricultural
terrorism (agroterrorism), and state-sponsored bioterrorism. This chapter will also serve to
discuss why terrorist groups would choose to use biological agents to accomplish their goals over
other weapons by examining the advantages and disadvantages of using biological weapons. On
the other side, this chapter will also examine the reasons a nation would want to supply a terrorist
organization with biological weapons, what pros and cons come from being a state-sponsor of
terrorism, and what countries are most likely to act this way.
Chapter VI will continue to expand on the information provided in Chapter V by giving
an in-depth analysis of what the threat of bioterrorism looks like in America. This chapter will
revisit the biological programs of the states talked about in Chapter III and pair them with
terrorist organizations while expanding on what a true biological attack would look like on
American assets at home and abroad. This chapter will show the most likely weapon to be used,
how it would spread, who and what it would affect, and the most likely places it would occur in
each instance.
Chapter VII will switch focus from the threat of bioterrorism to the limited American
biodefense structure. This chapter will be used to provide policy recommendations on how the

6

United States can work towards preventing and, in the unfortunate case of a biological terrorist
attack, containing the threat.
Overall, the probability of a state-sponsored bioterrorist attack being an event the next
generation must contend with becomes more likely every day. The United States has prepared
for another anthrax attack, created vaccines for commonly seen pathogens, and even increased
airport security, so we never experience 9/11 again. However, should a biological attack rain
down on our nation, whether in our backyard or our home away from home, there is no
procedure to follow. Therefore, it is so important for the United States to fully understand all the
very real dangers of bioterrorism and make policy changes that ensure it is ready to prevent,
contain, and respond to future attacks. We desperately need to stop pretending that these awful
consequences will not befall us and realize that not only could an attack take place ‘someday’ but
that ‘someday’ could be tomorrow.

7

CHAPTER II: DISEASES THAT AFFECT HUMANS, LIVESTOCK, CROPS, AND
WATER
While this thesis could not possibly cover all disease that could prove to be a threat against
the United States and its assets, it is important to cover the most pertinent ones, such as the
Category A pathogens, as dictated by the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Category A
pathogens are defined by the CDC as, “high priority agents that pose a risk to national security
because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person, result in high
mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact, might cause public panic
and social disruption, and require special action for public health preparedness.” 13 These agents
tend only to affect humans, but there can be some cross contamination. However, people are not
the only United States’ ‘asset’ that could be threatened. Agriculture, including livestock and
crops, as well as water are at risk of being contaminated by diseases. While that type of infection
does not directly affect humans, it has the potential to cause grave economic damage to the
United States. As such, this chapter will review a variety of diseases grouped as follows:
•

Diseases affecting humans,

•

Diseases affecting livestock and crops; and

•

Diseases affecting water

Within these groups the following aspects will be examined for each disease, although not
necessarily in this order:
•

Brief History of the Disease

•

Scientific Nature

13. “Category A: Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases,” Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, April 4, 2018, https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp#catdef.
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•

Symptoms

•

How it Spreads

•

What it Targets

•

The Last Known Appearance of the Disease within the United States, if any

•

Where it occurs naturally

•

Potential for Use as a Biological Weapon

•

Vaccines or Solutions

This chapter is not meant to be strictly technical but will look at some scientific aspects of
the disease. The purpose of this chapter is to give a better understanding of the danger and
lethality of the pathogens the United States must be concerned with and provide a reference for
the rest of the thesis.

Diseases Affecting Humans
Perhaps most pertinent to this thesis are the diseases affecting humans and the ones
affecting livestock as a biological attack of this nature would be the most devastating to the
United States in terms of human lives lost and economic impact. While this chapter breaks down
the two into separate categories as a way of simplifying the list, the two sections go hand in
hand. Most of the diseases covered in these two sections can be devastating due to their zoonotic
nature. Zoonotic diseases are defined as “diseases that can be transmitted from animals to people,
or more specifically, diseases that normally exist in animals, but that can infect humans.” 14 For
example, the Bubonic plague was originally found in fleas on black rats but eventually spread to

14. “Medical Definition of Zoonotic,” Medicine Net, December 11, 2018,
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=12958.
9

humans due to close contact and unsanitary conditions. 15 Another example in these two sections
comes from the Nipah virus. As recently as May 2018, an outbreak of the Nipah virus was
reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). Four people died from the Nipah virus after
contracting it from bats living in a well on the family’s new property. Proximity to the bats was
considered the source of the outbreak, indicating just how easily these pathogens can be
transmitted from one subject to another, but also indicating how hard it is to eradicate these types
of diseases. The first section will cover all Category A pathogens, as indicated by the CDC,
including Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Smallpox, Tularemia, and Viral Hemorrhagic fevers,
specifically Ebola. This is by no means a complete list of diseases that could be used for
biological weapons, but it covers the most common and most likely pathogens in question.
Anthrax. Anthrax is “an infectious disease caused by gram-positive, rod-shaped bacteria
known as Bacillus anthracis.” 16 Anthrax is thought to have originated from Egypt and the
Mesopotamia as early as 700 B.C. It is believed that one of the plagues described as affecting
hoofed animals could be describing anthrax. 17 The first clinical descriptions on anthrax did not
occur until nearly 2,400 years later in the 1700s when Maret gave descriptions in 1752 and
Fournier in 1769. 18 By the early 1900s, anthrax was well documented by the Americans, and
later on that year it was being used in several biological weapons programs around the globe.

15. Christian Nordqvist, “Origins of the Black Death Traced Back to China, Gene
Sequencing has Revealed,” Medical News Today, November 1, 2010,
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/206309.php.
16. “Anthrax,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, January 31, 2017,
https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/.
17. “A History of Anthrax,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, August 15,
2016, https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/resources/history/index.html.
18. “A History of Anthrax.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
10

Currently, anthrax is still suspected of being part of some biological weapons program, but
mostly remains a rare disease found mostly in animals and those working with animals.
While anthrax is considered a serious disease, it is treatable if caught early. However, due
to anthrax’s long incubation period, it could be hard to catch early, allowing the disease to spread
undetected for up to two months before medical professionals catch the infection. 19 For this
reason, the disease makes for an effective biological weapon.
Symptoms of anthrax vary depending on how a person encountered the disease. If a
person were to touch anthrax dust, an animal infected with anthrax, or contaminated animal
products, then that person could expect to see small groups of blisters or bumps that itch,
possible swelling or skin ulcers with black centers often appearing on the face, neck, arms, or
hands. 20 However, if a person were to inhale or ingest anthrax, that person could expect to see
more severe symptoms, including fever, chest discomfort, confusion or dizziness, a cough,
nausea, vomiting, or stomach pains, headache, and swelling. 21 The onset of any of these
symptoms could indicate a serious anthrax infection.
In their lifetime, most people will never be exposed to anthrax, but it is not impossible.
People handling animal products, veterinarians, farmers, and laboratory professionals are all at
risk. Anthrax is most commonly transferred through cuts on the skin. Therefore, people handling
animal products like wool, hair, hides, and bones can encounter the bacteria and become infected
if it enters a cut or scratch in the skin causing an infection. It is also possible for anthrax spores

19. “Anthrax Symptoms,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, July 23, 2014,
https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/basics/symptoms.html.
20. “Anthrax Symptoms.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
21. “Anthrax Symptoms.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
11

to be inhaled or ingested from contact with infected meat or other animal products. 22 However,
in the case of a biological attack, an attacking entity would likely use anthrax powder sent
through the mail reminiscent of the 2001 Anthrax attacks which resulted in the deaths of five
people. 23 For this reason, the CDC mentions that mail handlers, military personnel, and response
workers are also at risk if there is a bioterror attack involving anthrax spores. 24
The last occurrence of an anthrax infection in the United States was in 2011. While on a
cross-country road trip, a retired couple was forced to go to the emergency room because the
husband was complaining of flu-like symptoms. It was diagnosed as anthrax. Naturally occurring
anthrax infections are so rare in the United States that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was
brought in to find out if this could have been a bioterror attack, but ultimately it was ruled as a
strange occurrence. Luckily due to the anthrax vaccine and a specialized anthrax antitoxin, the
man recovered and was sent home. 25
Instances like the one above may indicate the need for mandatory country-wide
vaccinations, but due to the rarity of anthrax outbreaks, the anthrax vaccine is only provided for
those who are at an increased risk of becoming infected. Currently, the vaccine is not available
for use on children under the age of 18, adults over the age of 65, or pregnant and nursing

22. “Anthrax (Malignant Edema, Woolsorters’ Disease),” New York State Department of
Health, October 2011,
https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/communicable/anthrax/fact_sheet.htm.
23. “Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded,” NPR, February 15, 2011,
https://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded.
24. “Anthrax.” New York State Department of Health.
25. “A History of Anthrax.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
12

women. Despite these limitations, the anthrax vaccine’s effectiveness is around 93% for people
completing primary vaccines and occasional maintenance boosters. 26
Despite the rarity of human infections, anthrax can be found worldwide in wild and
domestic hoofed animals, like cattle, sheep, goats, camels, and antelopes. 27 Even so, its transfer
to humans remains rare and unpredictable.
Botulism. Botulism is “a rare but serious illness caused by a toxin that attacks the body’s
nerves.” 28 The toxin is made by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum or sometimes Clostridium
butyricum and Clostridium baratii bacteria. While these bacteria do occur naturally around the
world, it is unlikely to make people sick unless growing under certain conditions that include
low-oxygen, low acid, low sugar, and low salt environments. For example, improperly canned
goods can create an environment ripe for growing botulinum toxin.29
Botulism was first recorded in Europe in 1735 and was suspected of being associated with
German sausage. For this reason, it was named after the Latin word for sausage, “botulus.” 30
Since then Botulism has been classified into four different types:
1. Food-born Botulism
2. Wound Botulism

26. “About the Anthrax Vaccine,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
November 22, 2016, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/anthrax/hcp/about-vaccine.html.
27. “Anthrax.” New York State Department of Health
28. “About Botulism,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, October 4, 2018,
https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/general.html.
29. “About Botulism.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
30. “James Sterba, “The History of Botulism,” The New York Times, April 28, 1982,
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/28/garden/the-history-of-botulism.html.
13

3. Infant Botulism, and
4. Adult Intestinal Colonization Botulism
All types of botulism are considered life-threatening and can produce symptoms like double
vision, blurred vision, drooping eyelids, slurred speech, difficulty swallowing, dry mouth,
muscle weakness, and flaccid, symmetric, descending paralysis. 31 However, if caught early
botulism can be treated with antitoxins in a hospital. Modern antitoxins have improved the
chances of surviving botulism from 50% to 95%. 32 At present, there is at least one vaccine, the
Pentavalent botulinum toxoid (PBT) vaccine, in service today, and there are several more
vaccines under development. 33
Botulism is unique in that it cannot be transferred person to person, but instead must be
transferred directly from contaminated food or naturally occurring bacteria. For this reason,
botulism, while highly lethal and damaging, would be unlikely to make an effective biological
weapon unless overwhelmingly infected into commonly bought canned goods that are widely
distributed.
The CDC last reported in 2016 that there were 205 confirmed cases of botulism within the
United States. Statistics for 2017 and 2018 have not yet been released, but based on reports in
2015 and 2016, cases of botulism are trending up. 34

31. “Botulism,” Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care,
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/publications/disease/botulism.aspx, (accessed January 12,
2019).
32. “Botulism Diagnosis and Treatment,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
October 4, 2018, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/testing-treatment.html.
34.

33. Leonard Smith, “Botulism and Vaccines for its Prevention,” Vaccine 27, no.4 (2009):

34. “Botulism Surveillance,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, October 4,
2018, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/surveillance.html.
14

Plague. Plague, or more commonly known as the bubonic plague, is “a disease that affects
humans and other mammals caused by the bacterium, Yersinia pestis.” 35 Humans typically
contract the disease after being bitten by an infected flea or by handling an infected animal.
Historically, the plague is most known for killing a third of the European human population, an
estimated 25 million people, in the 1300s; a period that was known as the Black Death. 36
However, the first recorded Plague pandemic happened nearly 1,000 years earlier in the
Mediterranean basin. This pandemic also killed almost 25 million people over the next 300 years
as it was nearly impossible to contain completely. 37 Most recently, a third pandemic, named the
Modern Plague, appeared in China, killing approximately 10 million in 20 years. 38 Currently,
there are limited outbreaks due to better sanitation and antibiotics that provide infected persons
with a far higher chance of surviving the infection.
While it is most commonly transmitted by fleas and animals, it is possible to catch the
plague from a transfer of bodily fluids like spit when coughing or sneezing, making it highly
contagious. Due to its highly contagious nature, the plague has in the past often been used as a
biological weapon. Some examples of these biological warfare strategies include throwing
infected corpses over city walls, dropping flea bombs from airplanes, and even aerosolizing the

35. “Plague,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, November 27, 2018,
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36. “Plague.” National Geographic.
37. William Rosen, Justinian’s Flew: Plague, Empire, and the Birth of Europe (New
York City: Penguin Random House, 2007), p. 3.
38. Iqbal Khan, “Plague: The Dreadful Visitation Occupying the Human Mind for
Centuries,” Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 98, no.5 (2005):
274.
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bacteria during the Cold War. 39 However, more recently plague has raised a national security
concern for its potential to be used as a bioterror weapon due to its prevalence across the globe.
The bacteria needed for a weapon can be easily collected and transported, making it an effective
bioweapon choice. As of now, there are no known bioweapons utilizing plague bacteria in
existence, but its potential for future use is high.
There are three forms that plague can take; Bubonic, Septicemic, and Pneumonic.
Bubonic and Septicemic plague are both transmitted by the bite of an infected flea or the
handling of an infected animal, while Pneumonic plague is often transmitted by inhaling
infectious droplets of the plague, like for example, from someone’s uncovered cough. 40 Despite
these differences, most of the symptoms of all three plagues remain similar and include fever,
headache, chills, and weakness. It can also include painful lymph nodes, internal bleeding, and
sometimes a cough. 41
Within the United States, an average of seven human cases of plague occur each year as
plague bacteria is still naturally found in the Western United States. However, plague outbreaks
and epidemics are still occurring in Africa, Asia, and South America; the biggest outbreak is
currently occurring in Madagascar affecting over 1,000 people. 42 Today, cases of plague still
occur anywhere that fleas and rats can be found, but typically it is more common in rural areas.
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While a plague vaccine exists, it is not recommended for anyone other than those at high
risk of exposure. In most cases, the disease is treated retroactively using antibiotics in a hospital.
If it is caught early enough, the survival rate is over 85% for bubonic and over 60% for those
with septicemic and pneumonic. 43
Smallpox. Smallpox is probably the world’s most unique disease as it has been and can
remain completely eradicated from human populations. Unlike most other diseases mentioned in
this chapter, smallpox cannot be passed from animals to humans and therefore can be eradicated
using mandatory vaccines and preventive measures. WHO declared smallpox eradicated in 1980
after the last known case of smallpox was reported in Somalia in 1977. 44
Before its eradication, smallpox was a serious infection caused by a strand of the variola
virus, the same virus that causes chickenpox. 45 The disease is thought to date back to the
Egyptian Empire back in 3rd Century BCE, based on a rash found on mummies, but its true
origin remains unknown. 46 From then on the disease is thought to have spread from country to
country as part of trade routes and colonization. By the 18th century, smallpox had spread all
over the world. This was around the same time that the basis for vaccination began. By the mid-
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1800s, vaccination was slowly becoming the norm, then in 1959 WHO initiated a plan to rid the
world of smallpox. By 1980, the disease was declared eradicated worldwide. 47
After the eradication of smallpox, countries around the world recognized both the need
for a continuing study on the variola virus and the need to limit the virus’ continued existence in
the world. As a solution, an international agreement was made to limit the number of research
facilities to four different countries, the United States, England, Russia, and South Africa. Less
than five years later, England and South Africa gave up their stockpiles to other approved labs. 48
Today, there are only two official locations where the variola virus is stored and handled under
WHO supervision: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, and the
State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR Institute) in Koltsovo,
Russia. 49 However, there is speculation that multiple other countries may have gotten stockpiles
of the vaccine from the former Soviet Union or kept parts of the disease from their last natural
outbreaks, making it a possible disease for biological warfare. If smallpox were to be re-released
on human populations, it would likely cause worldwide panic and contamination as younger
generations are not as likely to be vaccinated because the disease is thought to have been
eradicated.
Before the eradication of smallpox, it was spread through direct and prolonged face-toface contact between a non-contaminated person and a contaminated one. But it could also be
spread through coughing, sneezing, and other infectious droplets being passed between people.
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18

As well, the virus could be spread through contaminated objects, like blankets or clothing. 50 This
is what countries in Europe did to decimate Native American populations, by giving them
smallpox-contaminated blankets. At first, the symptoms of smallpox tend to model the common
cold, then a rash begins in the mouth and spreads all over the body. In the third stage, the rash
turns into pustules before eventually scabbing over and falling off. 51
Fortunately, there is a smallpox vaccine. The vaccine is made from a virus called
vaccinia, which is considered a less harmful poxvirus. According to the CDC, “the vaccine does
not contain the smallpox virus and cannot give you smallpox.” However, unique to this vaccine
is the fact that it contains a live virus and not a dead or weakened one like most other vaccines,
but the vaccine was proven 95% effective at protecting people against smallpox. 52 Routine
smallpox vaccinations were stopped in the United States in 1972 after smallpox was eradicated
in the United States in 1949 during its last natural outbreak.
Despite the unlikelihood of a biological attack using smallpox, the CDC continues to
prepare for the possibility of one by continuing research on the disease and creating contingency
plans in case of an outbreak.
Tularemia. Tularemia affects both animals and humans and can be transmitted through
tick and deer fly bites, skin contact with infected animals, drinking contaminated water, inhaling
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contaminated aerosols, or laboratory exposure. 53 The disease itself is a rare infectious disease
that is caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis. 54 It typically attacks the skin, eyes, lymph
nodes, and lungs causing symptoms like skin lesions, high fevers, difficulty breathing, and
swelling. 55 These symptoms usually appear within 3-5 days after exposure but could take up to
14 days.
The tularemia bacteria have been recognized as a human pathogen for nearly 100 years,
but there are instances of the disease dating back hundreds of years before its recognition. 56
Tularemia is the disease that was used in the first ever recorded biological attack during the
Hittite Plague. The attack consisted of the Hittites using infected or ‘cursed rams’ against their
enemies to infect them, making it easier for them to win the war. However, it was not until the
early 1900s that tularemia was officially discovered and nicknamed ‘rabbit fever.’ 57 Years later,
multiple biological weapons programs around the world were studying its highly infectious
nature as a possible biological weapon against their enemies. Soviet Union scientists allegedly
developed a strand of tularemia that was vaccine-resistant to use as a biological weapon that it
tested in the 1980s. 58 However, there is no proof that it was successful or ever used in combat.
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Today, tularemia continues to occur naturally in every state in the United States except
Hawaii. The bacteria also occur in most other parts of the world. Due to its prolific nature, the
disease can easily be isolated and grown in great quantities in laboratories. As well, its ability to
be transmitted multiple ways can make it a versatile disease for weaponization, although
developing an aerosol version is considered extremely sophisticated. 59 There is currently a
vaccine under review by the Food and Drug Administration, but it isn’t currently available in the
United States. 60 Presently, if a person is diagnosed with tularemia, antibiotics can be prescribed
to help a person beat the disease. In the case of an intentional release of the disease during a
biological attack, the United States stockpiles antibiotics for treatment.
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (Ebola). Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) is a term used to
define an entire group of illnesses caused by several families of viruses. The classification
usually describes an illness that affects multiple organ systems and causes some form of bleeding
(hemorrhaging). 61 Due to the high number of diseases that fall under this category, this section
will focus primarily on the Ebola virus because it is considered a CDC Category A pathogen and
it is a currently a very real threat in the world as outbreaks are continuing to occur at an
accelerated rate.
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The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is considered a rare, but deadly disease found most
commonly in people and nonhuman primates. The viruses thought to cause EVD are naturally
found in sub-Saharan Africa, but anyone can be at risk of catching the disease if they happen to
encounter an infected animal, normally a bat or nonhuman primate, or an infected person either
dead or alive. 62 EVD is a group of viruses within the genus Ebolavirus that can cause infection.
According to the CDC, there are currently six known viruses:
•

Ebola virus (species Zaire ebolavirus)

•

Sudan virus (species Sudan ebolavirus)

•

Taï Forest virus (species Taï Forest ebolavirus, formerly Côte d’Ivoire
ebolavirus)

•

Bundibugyo virus (species Bundibugyo ebolavirus)

•

Reston virus (species Reston ebolavirus)

•

Bombali virus (species Bombali ebolavirus)

However, of these six, only four are known to cause infection in humans: the Ebola, Sudan, Tai
Forest, and Bundibugyo viruses. 63
EVD is a relatively new virus as it was only first discovered in 1976 near the Ebola River
in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since 1976, the virus has caused severe
outbreaks in multiple African nations and has even spread to nations outside of Africa because of
infected aid workers. 64 EVD is a highly infectious disease that can spread through direct contact
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with bodily fluids of infected persons or items that have been contaminated. It can also be spread
from animals (mainly nonhuman primates, but also bats) to humans.
Currently, there is no approved vaccine or treatment for EVD. The symptoms of the
disease are treated as they appear, but the root cause cannot be treated yet. Those who contract
EVD are often provided fluids, oxygen therapy, a medication that treats high blood pressure,
reduce vomiting, and manage fevers and pain. 65
All these factors, the infectiousness, lack of antiviral, and current prolific nature, make
EVD an interesting, but a possibly effective biological weapon for enemy state and non-state
actors to use against the United States. In 2014, at least four people within the United States were
diagnosed with Ebola after the first travel-associated case of EVD was recorded. 66 It took weeks
for the United States to contain a relatively small outbreak because hospitals were unprepared to
deal with a disease that was only associated with Africa’s poorest nations.
If EVD were to be released into the United States on a larger scale, it would be even
harder to contain. Its early symptoms are nearly indistinguishable from other VHDs, and its rapid
infection rate could rage across the population before the United States is aware it is happening.

Diseases Affecting Livestock and Crops
Biological terrorism is not unique to human populations. In 2002, a group of navy seals
found Al-Qaeda plans for a biological attack on the United States agriculture and livestock,
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meant to devastate the U.S. economy instead of its population. 67 Given past examples of extreme
agricultural epidemics, such as the potato famine, it is possible that an agricultural attack would
have that exact given response. The United States is the world’s largest beef producer and the
second largest beef export, making livestock roughly a 50 billion dollar industry, with poultry in
a close second at 42 billion dollars. 68 As well, the agricultural industry, in 2016, contributed 1.08
trillion dollars to the United States’ GDP. 69 Both are significant industries that if interrupted
could have devastating effects on the United States’ overall economy. The diseases below were
chosen for this section, in part, because of their devastating effects, but also their potential to be
used as biological weapons. For this section, it will start with livestock diseases and then move
on to agricultural ones.
Glanders. Glanders, caused by the bacterium Burkholderia mallei, is an infectious
disease that mainly affects horses, but can also naturally occur in donkeys, mules, goats, dogs,
and cats. 70 It is also classified as a zoonotic disease and is considered a Category B, second
highest priority, for the CDC. It was first described by the Greeks in 450-425 BC and then again
by the Romans nearly 1,000 years later. It wasn’t until 1882 that the cause agent B. mallei was

67. Tom Daschle and Richard Myers, “A Threat to the Food System,” US News, October
17, 2016, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-10-17/americas-food-supply-andnational-security-are-at-risk-to-bioterrorism.
68. “Overview of U.S. Livestock, Poultry, and Aquaculture Production in 2017,”
National Agricultural Statistics Service, November 3, 2017,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahms/downloads/Demographics2017.pdf.
69. “Farm Contribution to Agricultural GDP at Record Low,” American Farm Bureau
Federation, June 12, 2018, https://www.fb.org/market-intel/farm-contribution-to-agriculturalgdp-at-record-low.
70. “Glanders,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, October 31, 2017,
https://www.cdc.gov/glanders/index.html.
24

isolated by multiple scientists in Germany. 71 Today, glanders is thought to be eradicated in most
of the developed world but is still found naturally in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South
America. 72 Its last natural occurrence in the United States was in the 1930s, but more recently, it
has occasionally been reintroduced in Europe via imported horses.
The disease is normally marked by swellings, depression, lack of appetite, and increased
respiratory rate. Most visibly, it causes puss-filled nodules that enlarge, ulcerate, and eventually
drain. 73 It is through contact with these nodules that other animals and occasionally humans can
catch the disease. At present, there is no vaccine for the disease.
The lethality of glanders and lack of a vaccine makes it an ideal biological warfare agent.
There are even reports of the disease being used in this fashion in past wars. In World War 1, it is
believed that the Germans intentionally spread glanders to decimate Russian horses and mules to
disrupt weapon convoys, troop movements, and supply trains. 74 During the Cold War, the
Former Soviet Union and the United States all studied the possibility of weaponizing glanders in
biological warfare, but only the Former Soviet Union weaponized the disease, later deploying in
Afghanistan in the 1980s. 75 This disease is tried and true for use as a biological weapon, and it
isn’t impossible to conceive that it could be released again in the future.
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Newcastle Disease Virus. Closely related to the measles virus, the Newcastle Disease
Virus (NDV) is a neurotropic paramyxovirus that mainly affects poultry populations but is
currently controlled in developed nations by mass vaccination. 76 It normally presents as an acute
respiratory disease, but can also have symptoms like depression, nervous manifestations, or
diarrhea. 77 The severity of the symptoms can often give clues to physicians on the virulence of
the infectious disease.
NDV was first identified in Indonesia, and then again in Newcastle England in the late
1920s, although some scientists theorize that the disease was present as early as the 1890s were
when a disease wiped out entire populations of wildfowl in Scotland. 78 From there, NDV
ravaged bird populations all across England forcing the government to slaughter any bird they
feared was infected by NDV. 79 This eradication policy didn’t stop until the 1960s when vaccines
were introduced for the disease, and the original epidemic was mostly contained.
NDV strains are indigenous to poultry in most of Asia, Africa, and some countries in
both North and South America. 80 It is highly infectious, normally being passed through exhaled
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air, respiratory discharges, and feces. It is also possible for the disease to be passed from a
mother chicken to its eggs. 81 Fortunately, vaccines are available for most poultry, like chicken
and turkeys, that can be used to help prevent the spread of the disease. These vaccines, plus
strong import restrictions and eradication efforts have managed to keep the United States
disease-free. As such, the last reported NDV outbreak within the United States occurred in 20022003, originating from illegally imported game fowl before moving on to domestic poultry. 82
The disease ultimately spread throughout four states affecting commercial markets before being
contained.
Presently, a release of the NDV within the United States, especially at a higher
concentration, would be devastating to the $42 billion-dollar poultry industry. Vienna Brown and
Sarah Bevins explain, “a viral incursion of NDV into the U.S. could likely cause severe
morbidity and mortality in the domestic poultry industry in addition to enormous economic
losses primarily associated with trade restrictions.” 83 An NDV biological attack against the
United States would be devastating on multiple fronts.
Foot and Mouth Disease. Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), not to be confused with
Hand, Foot, and Mouth Disease that primarily affects children is a highly infectious animal
disease caused by an Aphthovirus that mainly affects cloven-hooved animals such as cattle, pigs,
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sheep, goats, and possibly alpacas and llamas. 84 Infection of the disease is characterized by fever
and fluid-filled cysts that normally appear around the mouth and feet, giving it its name ‘Footand-Mouth Disease. 85 Any outbreak of FMD could have devastating effects, especially given the
United States’ massive cattle industry.
The earliest description of what was likely FMD occurred in 1514 in Italy. Hieronymi
Fracastorii described a disease only affecting cattle resulting in blisters appearing around the
mouth and feet of infected animals. 86 From then on, reports all around the world emerged about a
disease ravaging cattle population. It seemed no country was safe. Beginning in the 1900s,
scientists started to isolate different strands of the FMD virus, resulting in at least seven
variations that were unique to the areas affected. 87 Today, the disease continues to exist in Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East. Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Central and North America (the
last outbreak in the United States occurred in 1929) 88, and continental Western Europe have been
developed free of FMD, but due to the contagious nature of FMD, could fall victim to the disease
at any time in the future.
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FMD is considered the most dangerous threat to cattle populations around the world,
mostly due to its contagious and infectious nature. While its fatality rate is low, its morbidity rate
is nearly 100% meaning that if even one animal were to catch the disease, it would nearly always
infect the rest of the herd, as the disease can be spread through both contact and the air. 89 For
these reasons, FMD countries must remain constantly vigilant of a possible FMD infection.
A naturally occurring outbreak of FMD would be hurtful, but an intentional release of FMD on
cattle populations around the country would be devastating. For example, the 2001 FMD
outbreak in the United Kingdom caused losses of more than 10 billion dollars. An FMD outbreak
in South Korea cost the government nearly $2.7 billion. 90 An outbreak in the United States could
cost the government even more.
Nipah Virus. The Nipah Virus (NiV) is considered a Category C pathogen by the CDC,
essentially meaning it is a third priority disease because it is still emerging and could be
weaponized in the future. Like Ebola, NiV is a relatively new virus whose causative agent was
first identified in 1999 during an outbreak in Malaysia. 91 The disease is typically found in pigs
and, due to its zoonotic nature, humans in close contact with pigs. It has theorized that the
disease was originally transmitted from bats to pigs and then from pigs to humans. The disease
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can be transmitted directly from bats to humans and humans to humans with direct contact. 92 It is
also possible to catch the disease with direct contact with infected items, like clothing or food.
Most commonly, NiV presents with inflammation of the brain after a five to 14-day
incubation period. Other common symptoms include fever, headache, drowsiness, disorientation,
mental confusion, and serious nervous system deterioration. Within 48 hours of presenting these
symptoms, infected patients can go into a coma. 93 Approximately 40% of the infected die from
their symptoms. 94
As for pigs, the disease manifests with difficulty breathing, convulsions, harsh coughs,
and pneumonia. 95 Like FMD, NiV has high morbidity rates, but low mortality rates. Its harsh
effects on populations and the economy often stem from the need to euthanize contaminated pig
populations to protect human populations and prevent further spread. There is no true treatment
for NiV; doctors normally focus on treating the symptoms in hopes that the patient will recover.
Currently, the disease has only been reported in India and some South Asian nations,
although since the disease is so new, it is impossible to know where else the disease may
naturally occur. 96 Given this lack of information, a release of NiV within the United States could
be devastating, as the U.S. has never had to contend with this disease and there are no treatments
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available. Its high morbidity rate and long incubation period also lead to more widespread
contamination without knowledge of an outbreak. However, its relative newness also makes the
disease harder to weaponize and is likely an emerging threat over a present one.
Citrus Greening. Citrus greening, also known as Huanglongbing (HLB) or yellow
dragon disease, is a serious citrus plant disease caused by the disease-infected insects, called the
Asian citrus psyllid. 97 While the disease causes no harm to humans, it can be devastating for
American citrus plants. The disease causes trees to produce plants that are green, misshapen,
bitter, and unsuitable for sale. Once a tree has been infected, it is impossible to cure, and the tree
normally dies within a few years. 98 Even though there is no cure, citrus greening can normally be
prevented with proper use of pesticides and increased vigilance in monitoring insect populations
near citrus trees.
Currently, the disease is mainly found in multiple citrus-producing states and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, as well as China and Brazil, however; the disease has also been reported in all
Asian nations except Japan and multiple other South American nations. 99 It is believed that the
disease originated from China almost a hundred years ago and then spread with the help of
migrating insects as well as increased trade routes to multiple other countries. Its first reported
occurrence in the United States was in 2005, and within three years the disease had spread to
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affect nearly 80% of all citrus within Florida. 100 Today, the disease is still being reported in six
US states and as such citrus from those states is heavily regulated.
The devastating effects from naturally occurring outbreaks of citrus greening, showcase
just how devastating an intentional release of the disease could be, especially in places like
California, which does not always maintain consistent pesticide use. 101 Citrus greening is an
easily acquired disease that can be released on unsuspecting citrus farms, turning a once
profitable expenditure into a very costly one.
Bacterial Wilt, Brown Rot. Ralstonia, also known as Bacterial Wilt, Brown Rot because
of its symptoms, is a plant disease caused by the bacterium Ralstonia solanacearum. 102 It is a
soil-borne disease that causes bacterial wilting and brown rotting in a variety of host plants, but
most notably potatoes and tomatoes. 103 In potatoes, the first symptoms of the disease include
general wilting and yellowing of leaves. Once cut open, the potatoes often produce bacterial
slime, a unique indicator of the infection. In contrast, tomatoes showcase their symptoms in their
youngest leaves beginning with wilting and then the rest of the plant will wilt soon after.
Tomatoes also ooze bacterial slime when cut open and normally seem stunted in growth. 104

100. “Citrus Greening.” United States Department of Agriculture.
101. Ian Lovett, “Threat to California Citrus May Finish Backyard Trees,” The New York
Times, April 17, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/us/citrus-greening-diseasethreatens-california-trees.html.
102. “Bacterial Wilt, Brown Rot,” Koppert Biological Systems,
https://www.koppertus.com/challenges/disease-control/bacterial-wilt-brown-rot/, (accessed
January 10, 2019).
103. “Bacterial Wilt, Brown Rot.” Koppert Biological Systems.
104. “Bacterial Wilt, Brown Rot.” Koppert Biological Systems.
32

The disease is thought to have originated from Brazil in the early 1920s, where it is still
present today, but it is possible that the disease could have originated from any tropical, subtropical, or temperate nation as it is mostly found in those climates. 105 Not much else is known
overall about its exact origins or history.
While Ralstonia is not found in the United States, there have been isolated cases in 2003
and 2004 where it was imported via tropical climate nations to private greenhouses. 106 In both
cases, the disease was quickly isolated and eradicated. Despite its lack of appearances in the
United States, or perhaps because of it, Ralstonia is considered a bioterrorist organism in the
United States. 107 In this way, any occurrence of the disease within the United States is treated as
a biological attack against its agriculture and requires an in-depth response to ensure the
disease’s containment and eradication.
Brown Stripe Downy Mildew. Maize is the most widely produced grain in the United
States, so any disruption to that production would be devastating. Brown Stripe Downy Mildew
is a plant disease caused by the pathogen Sclerophthora rayssiae and has been deemed as a
potential biological weapon threat against the United States. Estimates in 2005 suggest that
“even if only 20% of the [maize] crop was affected, this could translate into a $4 billion loss. 108
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Due to these devastating effects, it is important for the United States to be able to quickly
recognize, diagnose, and contain any possible outbreaks of brown stripe downy mildew.
Maize that has been infected with brown stripe downy mildew tend to have leaves with
yellow, red, or purple stripes that run parallel to each other from one end of the leaf to the other.
Leaves on the bottom of the maize plant will show more severe signs of infection than those at
the top; however, in most cases the actual maize is unaffected. 109 The disease is often spread
through infected plant debris traveling by wind to other maize plants, reminiscent of pollination,
but with a far more severe result.
The disease is not normally found in the United States, but rather in places with
extremely heavy rainfall. It was first discovered in 1962 in India and has since spread across
Asia to infect fields in Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand. 110 As a result, any introduction
into the United States has the potential to be extremely devastating as we have not yet had to deal
with this type of pathogen.
Bacterial Leaf Streak. Bacterial Leaf Streak is a disease found primarily in corn, but
also in sugarcane, caused by the bacteria Xanthomonas vasicola. 111 The disease was first
confirmed in the United States in 2016 on Nebraskan corn. Since that diagnosis, the bacteria
have spread to Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas. 112 Before this, the bacteria had only been
found in corn fields in South Africa.
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Symptoms for bacterial leaf streak can present like other diseases, causing misdiagnoses
and confusion. Normally, bacterial leaf streak manifests as narrow stripes between the leaf veins
that can be brown, orange, or yellow and have slightly wavy edges, in contrast to more common
fungi. 113 In terms of prevention, not much is known how to prevent the disease, but most
commonly farmers use foliar fungicides and other bacterial management processes in hopes to
stem the spread; however, these processes are unlikely to treat or eradicate the disease. 114 The
lack of treatment leaves all corn populations within the United States at risk.
Most recently, the disease was confirmed in Wisconsin corn in 2018. Wisconsin was said
to have had one of their best production seasons for corn before diseases began devastating their
supply. 115 However, after previous diagnoses in the United States of the same disease, Wisconsin
was better prepared to handle an outbreak and is said to be managing it quite well despite the
lack of research done on bacterial leaf streak.
Given this unknown quality, bacterial leaf streak could make for a devastating
agricultural biological attack because so little research has been done and there are no current
‘tried and true’ containment methods. A successful attack on corn populations within the United
States could devastate production, exports, and eventually the overall economy.
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Diseases Affecting Water
In addition to diseases directly affecting humans, livestock, and crops, some diseases
indirectly affect these groups as well. Specifically, diseases affecting water, such as cholera,
have the potential to devastate fresh water supply within the United States and lead to population
and economic downfall. The CDC classifies all water toxins as Category B pathogens, indicating
that they are the second highest priority for the United States behind highly contagious diseases
like smallpox and Ebola. For this thesis, this chapter will look at two different toxins affecting
water supply: the bacteria-caused Cholera and the parasite-caused Crypto.
Cholera (Vibrio cholerae). Cholera is most infamously known because of cholera
pandemics in the United States in 1832 and 1849. It is believed that nearly 150,000 people died
as a result of cholera-contaminated water. 116 Despite its high notoriety, these two incidents were
only small parts of the overall second and third cholera pandemics. Cholera pandemics have
been broken down into seven different pandemics, separated by the years in which each smaller
outbreak occurred. The first pandemic was reported in 1817 in Bengal but had spread across
India by 1820. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of British troops in India, as well as
Indians, died as a result of the pandemic. 117 Almost exactly two hundred years later, the world is
experiencing the biggest cholera pandemic to date within Yemen. Nearly one million people
have been infected, and the death toll continues to rise as the country is amid a civil war.

116. William Beardslee, “The 1832 Cholera Epidemic in New York State: 19th Century
Responses to Cholerae Vibrio,” Varsity Tutors,
https://www.varsitytutors.com/earlyamerica/early-america-review/volume-4/the-1832-choleraepidemic-part-2, (accessed January 10, 2019).
117. J. Pike, “Cholera-Biological Weapons,” Global Security, October 23, 2007,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/bio_cholera.htm.
36

In contrast, the disease has been practically eradicated from the developed world. The last
known case in the United States was in the early 1900s, and now cholera is mostly found in subSaharan Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. 118 War-torn nations are particularly
vulnerable.
At its core, cholera is an acute diarrhoeal infection caused by the bacterium Vibrio
cholerae that typically infects people via contaminated food and water. 119 While it is most
commonly caused by infected water, it is also possible to ‘catch’ cholera from a person who has
already been infected as their bodily fluids tend to contain large amounts of Vibrio cholerae. A
cholera infection can manifest itself in many ways including profuse diarrhea, vomiting, rapid
heart rate, loss of skin elasticity, dry mucous membranes, low blood pressure, unquenchable
thirst, muscle cramps, and restlessness. 120 Despite these nightmare-ish symptoms, cholera is very
treatable and normally only a small percentage of the infected pass away. The disease can be
treated by common antibiotics and replenishing fluids.
As an easily treated disease, it might seem like cholera would not be a great biological
weapon choice, but its utility lies in its ability to disrupt agriculture and livestock production as
well as cause panic across the United States. By infecting a regularly used clean water supply
that may be used for irrigating fields, terrorists have the potential to contaminate entire farms full
of produce and livestock, spreading the disease easily and likely causing a severe economic
disruption while the United States’ government works to contain such an outbreak.
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Cryptosporidiosis. Cryptosporidium is not a pathogen, but rather a microscopic parasite
that, like cholera, is a diarrheal disease called cryptosporidiosis. Both the parasite and the disease
are more commonly known as “Crypto.” 121 The parasite is unique in that its outer shell allows it
to protect itself from common disinfection methods, making it the leading cause of waterborne
illness within the United States. 122 The disease is most commonly spread through water, drinking
and recreational, but it can also be spread through other contaminated materials.
The disease manifests in much the same way as cholera. It has similar symptoms like
vomiting, watery diarrhea, dehydration, and fever. 123 For this reason, the disease can often be
misdiagnosed in areas where both crypto and cholera are common.
Crypto was first discovered in 1907 after scientists recorded the disease in mice. The first
human case wasn’t reported until 1976, and by 1980 only seven human cases had been
confirmed. 124 Today, the parasite can be found worldwide and contributes to nearly half of all
waterborne parasitic diseases. 125 Within developing nations, nearly 8-19% of the population is
infected, but the number lowers to 1-3% in developed nations. 126 In the United States, it is
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estimated that nearly 30% of the population has contracted the parasite at least once in their
lifetimes. 127 Presently, other than anti-parasitic drugs, there is no recommended treatment for
Crypto and doctors tend to treat the symptoms while patients wait for recovery.
As a Category B disease, Crypto, like cholera, would be best used intentionally as a
disruptive and panic-causing biological agent. Its quick infection rate and ability to infect water
and spread to both animals and humans would likely cause economic damage due to disrupted
agricultural exports and human panic given an unprecedented nation-wide infection.

Summary
All diseases in this section have the potential to be devastating to the United States in
some way. Some of these diseases could cause human turmoil, while others’ utility lies in their
panic-inducing possibilities. Still, others could become a significant threat to the economy.
Either way, a clear understanding of the diseases that the United States is most notably at risk for
during a biological attack creates the basis for which the rest of this thesis is built.
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CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS OF STATE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS

Biological warfare has become synonymous with images of grotesque diseases and
biohazardous shallow graves full of corpses. Their innate destructive nature is what has led
multiple countries to pursue biological weapons programs throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.
Biological weapons were especially sought by nations that think they face an existential threat in
the Middle East and felt they needed better weapons for a more effective deterrent. While most
biological weapons programs focus on human-targeted pathogens, some programs also focus on
agents that can attack food sources, like crops and livestock, or water sources. This chapter will
discuss the biological weapons programs of Syria, Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. This list
is most certainly not comprehensive but is enough to demonstrate the threat faced by American
assets at home and abroad.
These five nations were chosen because there is adequate information available on their
programs and all these nations are considered adversaries of the United States. The following
country profiles will analyze a variety of aspects of the biological weapons program including
the history of the program, what weapons it has studied and tested, any anti-agricultural uses,
what actors in the state potentially have access to the weapons and their intent to use the
weapons, and any previous instances of use of biological weapons.

Syria
Syria has one of the most significant biological weapons programs known to the Middle
East. Syria has signed, but has not ratified, the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons

40

and their Destruction (BWC) on April 14, 1972. 128 However, just two years later in February
1974, the current U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams mentioned the
‘sophistication, completeness, and extensiveness’ 129 of Syria’s biological weapons program as
seen during the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. That was the last official mention of Syria’s
biological program until nearly 20 years later when the then current Director of U.S. Naval
Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, made a statement in front of the then Seapower,
Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
confirming Syria’s offensive biological weapons capability. 130
The next 30 years were marked by consistent reports from various governments
remarking on the likelihood of a covert Syrian biological weapons program. The resulting
program was likely a Frankenstein’ed version of the cold war powers’ biological weapons
programs including assistance and materials from the former Soviet Union, North Korea, China,
and other axis powers. However, despite this evidence, Syria continued to deny the program. In
November 2005, Syria submitted a report to the United Nations stating, “The Syrian Arab
Republic is a State that neither possesses nor intends to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
their means of delivery, or related materials, as Syria has made it clear in a number of statements
presented to the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and the First
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Committee of the General Assembly in New York, which deals with disarmament issues.” 131
The document also explicitly mentions Syria’s lack of biological weapons. But just two years
later, American Biodefense expert Jill Bellamy-Dekker theorized that Syria was willing and
ready to use biological weapons in Europe and Israel if the United States moved against Iran’s
nuclear facilities. Bellamy-Dekker also hypothesized that Syria’s study of the camel-pox virus
could lead to a weaponized version of smallpox. 132 Despite these theories that Syria had a limited
biological agent development program, it was unclear whether Syria could successfully
weaponize the diseases. It was not until 2012 that a spokesman for the Syrian Foreign Ministry
confirmed that the country possessed biological warfare materials. 133 In 2013, the US Director of
National Intelligence confirmed Syria’s stated biological warfare program after the Syrian
government sent the Syrian military to guard all biological stockpiles and testing sites. 134
Despite the confirmation, not much is known about Syria’s biological program. Syria’s
runs its suspected primary biological-weapon programs out of the Scientific Studies and
Research Center (SSRC) in Damascus, with additional laboratories in Aleppo and Homs. 135
However, it has hard to confirm biological weapon development because the infrastructure
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needed for creating weaponized viruses and vaccines is typically the same. Unlike chemical
weapons, which can be counted, and stockpiled, biological weapons are living organisms that are
not generally stockpiled so it is hard to know exactly where, what, and how much the
government may be researching and for what purposes.
As well, due to the nature of Syria’s government, it is likely that any biological program
is run out of several facilities, including military and civilian veterinary labs, pharmaceutical
labs, agro-industries, and even public-health institutes. 136 This situation embodies the threat that
the United States faces from dual-use technology. Nations that benefit from state-run public
medicine have valid excuses if caught studying infectious diseases, especially since the process
of making a disease a weapon and a disease a vaccine are nearly identical until the end.
By analyzing research in both the private and public spheres in Syria, experts have been
able to speculate on what diseases Syria possesses and how much of a threat those diseases pose.
To help designate threat levels, the Center for Disease Control has categorized different
pathogens into three different categories: Category A, Category B, and Category C. They intend
to better prepare for biological attacks, by recognizing and designating which pathogens are the
most threatening. Category A, the highest priority disease agents is defined as, “organisms that
pose a risk to national security because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted from
person to person, result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health
impact, might cause public panic and social disruption, and require special action for public
health preparedness.” 137 Category B agents are defined as “moderately easy to disseminate,
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result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates, and require specific enhancements of
the CDC’s diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.” 138 Category C agents include
“emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of
availability, ease of production and dissemination, and potential for high morbidity and mortality
rates and major health impact.” 139
Syrian Biological Weapon expert Dr. Jill Dekker explains that Syria has done work on
most Category A pathogens, including anthrax, plague, tularemia, botulinum, smallpox,
aflatoxin, cholera, ricin, and camelpox, likely making their program one of the deadliest in the
Middle East. 140 Its work on anthrax and smallpox specifically was very advanced. Dr. Dekker
noted that Syria has extensive expertise in the industrial cultivation of germs and viruses for the
civilian production of anthrax vaccines, also mentioning that Syria had contacted Russian
biological experts to help it create an anthrax germ capable of being installed in missile
warheads. 141
However, most notable about Syria is that it likely stockpiles the smallpox virus. The
smallpox disease is not a zoonotic disease, meaning that it cannot transfer between humans and
animals and vice versa, so when the world successfully eradicated smallpox, it should have been
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gone for good. 142 The only two confirmed stockpiles of smallpox are contained within the United
States and Russia. However, it is speculated that Syria may have used its smallpox outbreak in
1972 to stockpile the disease. It could have also stolen the illness from the former Soviet Union’s
stockpiles. As smallpox was eradicated nearly 40 years ago, countries have become more relaxed
about requiring vaccinations, so an intentional release of smallpox today would be devastating.
However, just the existence of a program is not enough to indicate a valid threat to the
United States. Threat is derived from two things: capability and intent. To measure the threat
posed to the American assets by Syria’s biological weapons program, we must look at both its
capabilities and its intent. It is clear from the above information that Syria has the skill to
produce weaponized pathogens. Its research into several Category A pathogens, especially
smallpox and anthrax, shows that if Syria wants to weaponize and deploy a biological agent, it
can do so, but now we must also look at whether Syria has the intent to deploy a biological attack
against the United States. To do this, it is essential to look at what actors play a role in the Syrian
government and could potentially have access to these biological weapons. In the case of Syria,
four main actors could gain access to Syria’s biological weapons. This includes the ruling
government of President Bashar al-Assad and his Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, two opposition
forces, the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). By looking at the intentions of all four of these actors, we can determine the
possibility of any of these government using biological weapons to achieve their means.
First, let’s discuss the government of President Bashar al-Assad. After a long civil war,
President Bashar al-Assad regained victory in Syria, minus one terrorist stronghold and
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opposition holdout, with the help of its allies Russia and Iran. Through the Syrian civil war,
President Assad has had one primary goal, to reunify his nation under his control and defeat the
so-called ‘terrorist opposition forces.’ 143 He has shown with his previous actions that he is
willing to do nearly anything to achieve his goal. In the past, this has included using chemical
weapons against his people.
As recently as April 2018, Assad has been accused of using chemical weapons against his
citizens in Douma. 144 This previous use of chemical weapons proves that Assad’s Syrian State is
not afraid to use Weapons of Mass Destruction, it isn’t difficult to suggest that Assad would also
be willing to use biological weapons as well. However, biological weapons do pose a secondary
threat to the Assad regime that chemical weapons do not, namely the danger of contamination.
Biological agents are living organisms that are not easily contained once released. Diseases like
smallpox and anthrax are highly contagious and are not constrained by borders. If Assad were to
use biological weapons, it is possible he could infect those loyal to him, which in theory could
decrease his will to use them. However, expert Dr. Jill Dekker asserts that it may not be an issue.
She explained, “in a retaliatory strike, biological weapons could be effectively released on an
unsuspecting population in a geographic region that would not pose a direct health threat to
Assad’s government or military.” 145 This essentially means that the Assad regime could release
the pathogen without adverse effects returning on his party.
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As well, Syria’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs during Assad’s reign had this to say
on the use of biological weapons, “No chemical or biological weapons will ever be used…
unless Syria is exposed to external aggression.” 146 This statement in itself is proof that Syria does
have the will to use biological weapons if it feels the need to do so. In this case, the United
States military presence in Syria may meet the criteria.
As for the two opposition forces, their intent with biological weapons is unclear at best.
The Free Syrian Army aims to be “the military wing of the Syrian people’s opposition to the
regime 147 , and it aims to bring down the government by armed operations, encouraging army
defections and by carrying out armed action.” 148 Nothing in their stated goal would lead to the
belief that they would use biological weapons, conventional weapons yes, but not biological.
Also given their proclivity for more closely following international laws surrounding warfare,
like avoiding attacking civilians when possible, indicates a lower willingness to utilize WMD.
The same can be said of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is an alliance of Kurdish,
Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian militias mainly fighting against ISIS and other Jihadist
groups in the Syrian Civil War. The group holds territory in the Northeast, and its primary goal
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remains to “establish and protect the federal region Rojava-Northern Syria.” 149 Again nothing in
their doctrine or proclamations indicate that they would be willing to use biological weapons.
Also, as this group and the Free Syrian Army are both backed with American support, it would
be highly unlikely that either group would use biological weapons.
The wildcard player remains the remnants of the terrorist group, ISIS, that still resides in
the area. ISIS is a Salafi jihadist militant group that follows a strict, fundamentalist Salafi
doctrine of Sunni Islam. 150 Its goal is to return to the early days of Islam, and it rejects any newer
innovations in the religion as it believes it to be corrupt. Its strict interpretation of Islam allows
for no deviations. Non-believers and believers in a different interpretation are apostates and must
be eliminated. 151 ISIS also believes in the coming apocalypse and is willing to do what is
necessary to bring about the apocalypse as it is when the “glorious moment of divine
comeuppance finally arrived.” 152 As well, ISIS has indicated that if the opportunity to use WMD
came about, they would unleash them to bring about the apocalypse. It then is not hard to argue
that should the Islamic State find a way to possess biological weapons in Syria, then American
troops in the Middle East would be at risk.
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In the case of Syria, the biggest threat continues to come from the possibility of ISIS
gaining control of biological weapons, while the second biggest comes from the potential of the
Assad regime using biological weapons. In both cases, the threat is credible and must be taken
seriously and monitored carefully.

Iran
Historically, Iran has denied the existence of a biological weapons program. The regime
signed and ratified the BTWC in 1973, but the United States intelligence community has
reported that while it does not have conclusive evidence that Iran has a military-ran biological
weapons program, it does have an extensive dual-use infrastructure for biotechnology. 153 It is
believed that Iran began its biological warfare research program during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s
interest was likely piqued because it was revealed that Iraq had increased its efforts to develop
biological weapons to use against Iran possibly. As well, due to the high costs of war, biological
weapons provided a cost-effective weapon that could also do substantial damage to enemy
populations. 154 Just three years later, it was reported that high-level Iranian officials were
approaching former Soviet Scientists to recruit them for Iran’s burgeoning biological weapons
program. Most of the offers were turned away, but some former Soviet scientists say that at least
five of their colleagues took jobs with Iran continuing work on pathogen weaponization and
several more accepted contracts that allowed them to remain in Russia while researching
biological agent weapons for Iran. 155 The former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program
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was considered the most extensive in the world, so by luring its former scientists to Iran, it had
the chance to significantly increase the size and possible effectiveness of Tehran’s biological
weapons program. At that time, there was direct evidence that supported the claim that the
former Soviet Union and modern Russia had helped Iran develop its chemical and nuclear
missile capabilities, so it isn’t hard to believe that Russia also helped develop Iran’s biological
weapons program. 156 The two countries are long-standing allies that have maintained that
alliance even today with their work in Syria.
In a 2001 unclassified report to Congress, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence
assessed that Iran, “probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents
for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so [as] Iran continues to expand its
biotechnology infrastructure and seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW.” 157 That
same year, a plan called the Comprehensive National Microbial Defense Plan was adopted by
Iran. 158 The project gave each ministry a specific task for increasing its biological warfare
capabilities. Soona Samsami, a former U.S. representative of the National Council of Resistance,
speculated that the Iranian biological research program primarily took place at the Tehran’s
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Pasteur Institute and the Vira Laboratory. However, there were also reports that research was
ongoing at several state universities around the nation. 159
Like Syria, Iran boasts an impressive dual-use biological research industry. Universities
around the country like the Revolutionary Guard Imam Hussein University and the Malek Ashtar
University were instrumental in researching several biological agents, both for vaccines and
offensive weapons. According to Ms. Samsami, anthrax is still studied at Imam Hussein
University, while the other has moved onto researching cloning and genetic alterations. 160 Iran
also has considerable expertise with the commercial and military infrastructure needed to create
and disseminate pathogens. Its pharmaceutical industry can be used for both offensive and
vaccine-related reasons.
Also, like Syria, Iran studied most Category A diseases with some notable differences.
Iran specifically attempted to make microbial bombs utilizing powdered versions of diseases,
including anthrax, smallpox, and typhoid fever. 161 It is speculated that Iran’s possible smallpox
stockpile and delivery mechanisms are due to the Soviet scientists they possibly have on staff. In
2008, it was reported that Iran as likely produced both toxins and live organisms as biological
warfare agents, perhaps even weaponizing a small portion of its arsenal. The same report
indicated that within ten years, Iran’s military forces “may be able to deliver biological agents
effectively.” 162
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As with Syria, we need to examine Iran’s will to use the biological warfare capability it
likely possesses. Fortunately, unlike Syria, Iran is not amid a civil war, meaning that there are
fewer actors within Iran that could gain access to biological weapons. Unfortunately, Iran is a
continuing sponsor of terrorism meaning that there is a slight change Iran could provide its
sponsored terrorist groups with biological weapons. In the case of Iran, we will examine the
intent of Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani, and then we will explore the aims of the terrorist
groups Hezbollah and Hamas if either were to obtain biological weapons.
The government of Iran has not publicly confirmed the existence of its biological warfare
program or its willingness to use such weapons. However, it has come out against the use of
chemical weapons because Iran’s soldiers were targeted with chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
War. 163 While some people might believe that this would put Iran off using chemical and
biological weapons, Iran has given no indication that it would limit itself in such a way. It is
notable that Iran has expressed its desire to gain nuclear capabilities and has recently tested new
missiles with the ability to reach American troops in the Middle East. 164 Iran’s recent aggression
towards the United States, since its withdrawal from the Iran deal, could indicate a willingness to
attack American bases in the Middle East and given that the majority of Iran’s biological
weapons program focused on bombs that could carry microbes, it isn’t too far of a leap to think
that Iran using biological warfare is a possibility.
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As for the terrorist organizations that have close working ties with Iran, both groups are
likely willing to use biological weapons, especially against Israel and its allies, including the
United States. The primary goal of Hamas is to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation by
resisting the Israeli government. 165 Most recently, Hamas has worked towards this goal by
launching rocket strikes against Israel in Gaza. 166 There have been no indications that Hamas
would refuse to use certain weapons, like biological ones, to achieve their objectives in Palestine.
However, it would pose a significant risk for Hamas to use biological weapons because the
effects of pathogens, like infection, are harder to contain and could contaminate Hamas fighters.
On the other hand, the goals of Hezbollah revolve around expelling the ‘colonist entity’
from their land in Lebanon. This includes getting rid of all American, French, and other allied
forces from the area. 167 Its founding Manifesto indicates that it has little to no problem utilizing
whatever weapons at their disposal to achieve their means. It reads,
Whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and
elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an integral
part... No one can imagine the importance of our military potential as our military
apparatus is not separate from our overall social fabric. Each of us is a fighting soldier.
And when it becomes necessary to carry out the Holy War, each of us takes up his
assignment in the fight by the injunctions of the Law, and that in the framework of the
mission carried out under the tutelage of the Commanding Jurist. 168
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More specifically, Hezbollah describes any act of violence committed against an Israeli as
‘legitimate resistance.” 169 Both instances indicate that Hezbollah would be ready and willing to
use biological weapons if they gain access to them.
But the likelihood of Iran giving either group biological weapons is small. According to
Daniel Byman at the Brookings Institute, “Despite Iran’s [genuine] support for terrorism for
more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 15 years, Tehran has
not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this restraint and
not transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.” 170 However, past precedent does not
confirm that Iran would continue this restraint and it would be naïve to hope so. Iran continues to
provide terrorist groups with conventional weapons; the next logical step would be providing
those same organizations with WMD. However, even if Iran does provide biological weapons to
these terrorist groups, they could still obtain these weapons by theft from the Iranian
government. In all three instances: a biological attack from Iran itself, Hamas, or Hezbollah
remains low risk/high impact, but possible.

North Korea
North Korea made a name for itself with its aggressive testing of ballistic weapons and
nuclear capabilities, but the country has remained uncharacteristically quiet on the state of its
biological weapons program. It was not until February 2017, when Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother
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was assassinated with the VX nerve agent, that the world shifted its focus from North Korea’s
nuclear program to the whole of its WMD program. 171 It has now been realized that North Korea
has been acquiring biological weapons since the beginning of the Cold War.
As early as the 1960s, North Korea began a biological weapons programs according to
South Korean intelligence reports and North Korea defectors. 172 Its biological weapons program
is suspected of having been an entirely indigenous effort, unlike its chemical weapons program
which was created with outside help. 173 Since then, North Korea has steadily been advancing its
biological weapons program to match the rest of the world in military might, in both
conventional and unconventional means. A 2016 White Paper from South Korea’s Ministry of
National Defense (MND) assessed that North Korea could cultivate various biological agents
including anthrax and smallpox.174 Both smallpox and anthrax are considered high priority
biological agents due to their destructive nature.
At first, North Korea only imported cultures of causative agents for diseases like plague
and cholera, but starting in the early 1980s, North Korea switched from pure research to
production of biological weapons agents and began conducting tests on political prisoners. 175 To
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stem the production of biological weapons by North Korea, countries around the world attempted
to strengthen export controls that would prevent North Korea from acquiring dual-use
technologies that would enable it to continue its biological weapons program. However, North
Korea proved resourceful in finding ways around these protocols. For example, in 2006, it was
discovered that North Korea had obtained a freeze dryer that could be used to freeze-dry
pathogens for extended storage of pathogens from a Tokyo-based company. 176 This
resourcefulness combined with a strong desire for a biological weapon capability enabled North
Korea to grow its biological program from the small research-based entity it once was into a
flourishing new capability.
More recently, Kim Jong Un was seen touring one of North Korea’s biotechnology
facilities, and the images showed that not only does the site have dual-use capabilities, but it
could also produce large batches of weaponized anthrax. 177 Still, due to the opacity of the North
Korean regime, knowledge on the extent of North Korea’s current biological weapons program is
lacking. The most recent report comes from an analysis issued by the Middlebury Institute of
International Studies at Monterey in December 2018. It reports that North Korea has been
working with foreign nations and researchers to build better biotechnology skills and machinery,
hence increasing their current biological capabilities. 178 But it’s a 2017 report from Harvard’s
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Belfer Center that touches on the extent and readiness of North Korea’s capabilities, explaining
that North Korea possesses several types of pathogens and dual-use facilities capable of
biological agent production. 179 The South Korea government even estimates that North Korea
could have its biological agents weaponized and ready to deploy in under ten days. 180 All of
these reports lead to one assured conclusion; the North Korean government possesses biological
weapons and is capable of using them.
North Korea has multiple labs where it can produce and weaponize biological agents, but
its lead research facility, according to North Korean defector Colonel Ju-Hwal Choi, is the Germ
Research Institute of the Armed Forces Ministry. 181 Other facilities include the Pyongyang
Biotechnical Institute and the Academy of National Defense. While the world agrees over the
fact that North Korea has biological weapons, there are conflicting reports on what types
pathogens are used in North Korea’s program. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments suggests the
Korean People’s Army (KPA) inventory might include the causative agents “Bacillus antrhacis
(Anthrax), Clostridium botulinum (Botulism), Vibrio cholera (Cholera), Hantavirus (Korean
Hemorrhagic Fever), Yersinia pestis (Plague), Variola (Smallpox), Salmonella typhi (Typhoid
Fever), and Coquillettida fuscopennata (Yellow Fever).” 182 However, audit documents done by
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the Ministry of National Defense (MND) assert that North Korea has nearly 13 different types of
pathogens in its program, adding that in addition to those mentioned above, North Korea also
uses Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Entamoeba histolyca (Dysentery), Staphylococcus
aureus (Staph), Rickettsia (Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever), and T-2 mycotoxins (Alimentary
Toxic Aleukia. 183 Most important about North Korea’s collection is its alleged possession of
smallpox, anthrax, plague, and cholera. Three of these diseases are included in the CDC’s
Category A pathogen list, and the forth (cholera) is considered a Category B pathogen. Any
release of these pathogens within the United States would prove devastating.
As for dispersal methods of these diseases, it has been speculated that North Korea can
put canisters of the agents on drones and deliver them to other nations. Recently, South Korea
has seen an increase in drones infiltrating its borders. An article by the Washington Post quotes a
high-level defector who stated, “I witnessed the mounting of undisclosed biological or chemical
weapons on drones, and the drones’ dispersal capabilities were tested on animal populations.” 184
He ends with some chilling words about how these drones could be readied and deployed to
South Korea within an hour. 185 This technology is not unlike what is being seen in other
countries like Iran and Syria, but there are differences in who might have access to these
diseases.
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Unlike Syria, North Korea is not facing an internal civil war where multiple actors could
have access to government resources. Instead, Kim Jong-Un is the sole leader of North Korea
and has the capability and authority to launch biological attacks. However, due to North Korea’s
status as a state-sponsor of terrorism, there is a high possibility that North Korea could provide
weapons to resistance groups in the Middle East as well as groups in Asia that serve to terrorize
South Korea. For example, North Korea could provide advanced technology to terrorists in Syria
fighting against the resistance as well as groups aimed at intimidating South Korea and Japan.
Consequently, despite its designation as a State-Sponsor of terrorism, the specific terrorist groups
it has supported remain unknown.
Like with Iran and Syria, a calculation needs to be made to estimate the threat of a
biological attack by North Korea or a terrorist organization supported by them. It is clear from
the above information that North Korea can launch a biological attack, but its intent is less clear.
Andrew C. Weber, a Pentagon official in charge of nuclear chemical and biological defense
programs under the Obama Administration, said, “North Korea is far more likely to use
biological weapons than nuclear ones. The program is advanced, underestimated, and highly
lethal.” 186 While this isn’t a direct declaration of intent by the regime, it does make it clear that
there are distinct advantages for the North Korean regime to use biological weapons over other
WMD. Since its program is consistently underestimated and less known, North Korea has an
advantage in using a lesser known program for an attack. While North Korea’s nuclear program
has been thrust into the spotlight, its biological weapons program remains an unknown element.
The United States would be more prepared for North Korea to use nuclear weapons over
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biological ones, so North Korea is more likely to cause more destruction using a program that the
United States is less prepared to handle.
North Korean leadership has also made statements indicating that they are willing to use
other WMD, so it is not a far leap to conclude that North Korea would also be ready to use
biological weapons. As well, there are reports from defectors that indicate prisoners of war,
criminals with a death sentence, and other enemies of the state have been used as test subjects for
biological weapons. 187 North Korea’s willingness to use biological weapons on its population
indicates a desire to use those same weapons on other countries’ populations. If a war breaks out
between North Korea and South Korea, North Korea could easily choose to use biological
weapons over nuclear weapons because the use of biological weapons is less likely to cause a
nuclear response from South Korea and its allies. While any WMD attack by North Korea on
South Korea is likely to cause the United States and South Korea to seek regime change,
biological weapons would be harder to attribute and depending on the disease could even be
deemed as a natural outbreak.

China
In 1952 and 1984, the People’s Republic of China signed the Geneva Protocol and
BTWC respectively. 188 During WWII, China was the victim of countless biological attacks by
Japan, leading to its future efforts to develop a stronger biodefense infrastructure and a
biotechnology industry with substantial dual-use capabilities. Due to its experience with

187. Ryall, “North Korea’s Bioweapons.”
188. “China,” NTI, November 2014,
https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/biological/.
60

biological attacks, China maintains that it does not have an offensive biological program, but its
dual-use infrastructure is plenty big enough to accommodate a shift in that public policy. 189
Despite these declarations, it has been suspected that China has maintained a biological weapons
program since before the signing of the BTWC.
A 2005 State Department compliance report noted that “China maintains some elements
of an offensive [biological weapon] capability in violation of its BTWC obligations. Despite
China’s declarations to the contrary, indications suggest that China maintained an offensive
[biological weapon] program before acceding to the Convention in 1984.” 190 Since signing the
BTWC, China has been a stringent supporter of the treaty desiring to improve both the
verification mechanism of the treaty as well as strengthen export controls to prevent the
proliferation of biological materials. But according to a U.S. intelligence official, China was the
biggest export violator of all as it had sold dual-use equipment and vaccines with both civilian
medical applications and biological weapons applications. These exports likely turned into the
beginnings of the Iranian Biological Weapons program. Then in 2006, China updated its export
control list to restrict 14 additional biological agents from being exported from the mainland. 191
Despite these actions, it is still believed that China has helped Iran and other Middle Eastern
nations build their biological weapons programs.
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Even so, reports from the United States in 2010, 2012, and 2014 all-state essentially the
same thing, that China likely possesses a biological weapons program, but the extent of the
program remains unknown to the public. 192 According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, it is clear
that “China possess the required technology and resources to mass-produce traditional
[biological weapon] agents as well as expertise in aerobiology." 193 Today, it is likely that China’s
current dual-use infrastructure acts as the basis for its offensive biological capability.
The 2005 State Department report also identifies two facilities that have links to an
offensive biological weapons program including the Chinese Ministry of Defense’s Academy of
Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology (IME) in
Beijing, and the Lanzhou Institute of Biological Produces (LIBP). 194 China responds that the
former is a biodefense-focused facility and the latter is a vaccine production facility. In addition
to these two central laboratories, it is estimated that there are at least 50 other laboratories and
hospitals being used as biological weapons research facilities.
China’s dual-use infrastructure also gives outsiders an idea of the make-up of its
offensive program. In 2007, China created a 20-year plant to study natural and human-made
epidemics to create protective equipment for biodefense. 195 It was part of China’s very public
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biodefense efforts. China has also established its first Biosafety Level 4 laboratory for research
into biodefense and vaccines. 196 This facility will house pathogens that are considered especially
dangerous including multiple Category A and Category B pathogens. Aside from pathogens,
China is also known for its advancements in dispersal and delivery systems. A journal article
titled, “China’s Biological Warfare Programme: An Integrative Study with Special Reference to
Biological Weapons Capabilities” reports that
It is fairly clear that certain RF have fully mastered the aerobiological technologies
needed for effective dispersal of BWA, both pathogens and toxins, and probably infected
vectors (insects) as well. The quality, extensiveness, and characteristics of aerobiological
works—including the component of nano-aerobiology—conducted by the related
facilities, unambiguously lead to that postulation. They are also able, in all likelihood, to
construct the functional conjunction combining dispersal devices, various warheads and
delivery systems—including surface-to-surface missiles—in terms of operational
biological weaponry. 197
This report makes it clear that China has an advanced capability for deploying and dispersing
aerosolized biological weapons. This sort of advanced capability is especially worrying because
aerosolized diseases are the most contagious types of disease and have the potential to infect the
most amount of people.
An advanced biological weapons program is not enough to classify as a threat; there also
needs to be a real intent to use those weapons, either by China or by terrorist groups that China
might support. When it comes to China’s intention, it is possible that China would not choose to
use biological weapons in any capacity because of the suffering the country saw due to Japan’s
use of Shigella and Plague against the nation. During the 1991 BTWC Review Conference, the
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Chinese delegation stated, “Of bacteriological weapons, China has always advocated the
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and pursues a policy of not
developing, producing, or stockpiling this type of weapon.” 198 More recently, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry’s came out in 2011 stating that China continues to support the “complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including
biological weapons. 199 At the same time, China was not involved in the BTWC negotiations and
before signing the treaty ensured it had a clause that meant the treaty was only binding if all
other countries in the treaty were also following the guidelines, essentially giving the state an out
to not only pursue biological weapons but to use them if necessary. 200 This action indicates that
the Chinese wish to leave the possibility of using biological weapons open as a policy weapon,
which in turns means a certain amount of willingness to utilize the weapons if the need arose.
Overall, this proves that while China likely has the capability, China, due to its experience with
biological warfare, seems to be the least likely country out of the five examined in this thesis to
use biological weapons.
However, other entities that might gain access to Chinese biological weapons with
China’s support, like the Taliban, might not have the same reservations. While China has
publicly decried acts of terrorism around the globe, its actions do not necessarily support its
words. In December 2000, The UN security council voted 13-0 to place an embargo on arms
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sales to the Taliban. China, however, chose to abstain. 201 In the following months, China
continued to hold secret meetings with Taliban leadership on a possible communications lines
deal and possible arms sales. 202 Since the 1980s, China has increasingly shipped large quantities
of conventional arms, technologies for nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missiles, and other
hardware used in the military to rogue regimes in the Middle East including the Taliban
government. 203 China continues to meet with the Taliban today. As recently as August 2018, the
PRC and the Taliban met to discuss a peace deal in Afghanistan and China continues to
diplomatically back the Taliban with its allies over the other parties. 204 This established
relationship with the Taliban creates a foundation for future arms sales to occur. The prospective
transfer of biological weapons from China to the Taliban is not outside the realm of possibility.
To understand the threat from the Taliban, the Taliban’s goals must be realized.
According to Stanford’s “Mapping Militant Organizations” page, the Taliban is a far-right
Islamist militant organization whose purpose is to establish an Afghanistan that is under Taliban
control and reinstate Sharia law. 205 Since their emergence, the Taliban has used suicide
bombings, car bombings, and other war tactics to achieve their means. This willingness to use
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nearly any means necessary to accomplish their political aspirations indicate that the Taliban
may also be willing to use biological weapons to attack the Afghani government.
Overall, the risk of a biological attack by China or the Taliban is likely pretty low, but
evidence indicates there is a more significant change of a biological attack carried out by the
Taliban than the government of China, although neither possibility is impossible.

Russia
Russia has inherited nearly all its biological weapon capabilities from the former Soviet
Union after it fell in 1991. The biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union was
herald as the most extensive covert biological weapons program ever in existence. In 1928, the
Soviet Union signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol, but due to the wording of the Protocol
justified their pursuit of a biological weapons program because the Protocol only prohibited ‘use’
and not research and production. 206 In its early years, the program established many different
testing sites, specifically on islands to test the effectiveness of dispersal methods.
During a tumultuous period in the Soviet Union’s history, three events stand out as
shaping the future of the Soviet Union’s offensive biological weapons program. First, in the late
1930s, Stalin purged many of the scientists that had been integral in developing the original
program. 207 Those that did not escape were often sent to prison or executed to root out traitors
and those who might oppose Stalin.
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Second, Stalin actively supported Trofim Lysenko, a scientist who believed that
biological inheritance led to the suppression of Mendelian genetics. These beliefs significantly
influenced the Soviet offensive biological weapons programs for years, by suppressing advances
in biological sciences, putting the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, until Lysenko’s theories were
disproved.
Lastly, the events of WWII changed the direction of the Soviet Biological Weapons
program. Initially, the purpose of the Soviet biological weapons program was to create tactical
battlefield weapons to be used on the enemy’s front lines and rear areas. 208 Its goal was to
develop weapons that could be used in place of conventional ones, so instead of an exploding
bomb with shrapnel, it would be a bomb with anthrax powder. According to Ken Alibek, a key
former Soviet scientist, “A devastating tularemia outbreak in the Red Army at Stalingrad in
1942, caused by Soviet use of Tularemia against the German army, demonstrated the danger and
unpredictability of biological warfare in a tactical setting, and forced the Soviet Union to shift
their biological weapon military doctrine away from tactical battlefield use.” 209 This shift led to
what is now Russia’s current biological weapons program.
In 1975, while the Soviet Union was acceding to the BTWC, it was also expanding its
biological weapons program, beginning with a secret decree by Brezhnev that aimed at
modernizing the current program. Ken Alibek explains that the directive included aims at
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weaponizing anthrax into a battle strain that could be used on a massive scale. 210 Specifically,
Anthrax 836 was meant to be “reproducible in large quantities, of high virulence, and
transportable.” 211 The Soviet Union wanted to be able to use highly contagious diseases to wreak
havoc on enemy populations in the case of strategic war. For this purpose, anthrax, smallpox,
and plague bacteria were used as test subjects, but tragedy struck in 1979 when an accident
caused the release of dry anthrax spores leading to the killing of about 67 people and infecting an
addition 77. 212 At this time, it became apparent to the outside world that the Soviet Union had
not halted its biological weapons program. Ten years later it became even more apparent when
Soviet scientists began to defect to Western nations and pass the information on to the
governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. 213 Most devastating to the Soviet
Union was Ken Alibek, the former First Deputy Director of Biopreparat, which made him privy
to all the inner workings of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons advantages.
The next 30 years were marked by diplomatic efforts by Western powers to convince
Russia to dismantle the Soviet Union’s biological weapons programs. Initially, Russia’s first
president, Boris Yeltsin, admitted to the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program, but just
seven years later, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s new president, reversed that admission stating that the
Soviet Union’s program had been completely defensive in nature. 214 This statement made it clear
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that Vladimir Putin would not be forced into dismantling this offensive biological weapons
program. In 2012, during his second presidency, Putin tasked his ministers with implementing
plans for new weapons including genetic ones. The Russian Ministry of Defense defines genetic
weapons as,
A type of weapon able to damage the genetic (hereditary) apparatus of people. It is
assumed/expected that some viruses can/may serve as the active principle. These viruses
are in possession of mutagenic activity (with the capability to cause hereditary changes)
and can introduce into chromosome cells that contain deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and
even chemical mutations, taken from natural sources by chemical synthesis or
biotechnological methods. The primary result of the use of genetic weapons is
damage/injury and changes to basic/primary structure of DNA, which can lead to serious
diseases and their hereditary transition. 215
Simply put, this definition gives a new, more advanced version of a biological weapon that
affects the internal structure, but still causes death and destruction. While modern Russia has
given biological weapons a new name, the concept is the same. Biological weapons are still a
genuine threat from Russia.
Due to the extensiveness of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program, the list of
diseases studied is unusually long. Scientists in the Soviet Union studied the causative agents of
anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, glanders, leprosy, melioidosis, plague, tetanus, tuberculosis,
tularemia, typhus, and Q fever. 216 Early manifestations of the program also studied the foot-andmouth disease virus for use against cattle. 217 A majority of these diseases result from pathogens
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that the United States is particularly worried about affecting the United States. Also, the Soviet
Union’s focus on agricultural diseases like glanders and foot-and-mouth disease is indicative of a
desire to possess a capability that can cause economic damage within the United States
agricultural sector.
Additionally, the Soviet Union assessed advanced methods of dispersal for efficiency
during the 1930s. These methods included aerosol generators, bacteria-filled containers dropped
from aircraft, explosive capsules, and insect/rodent vectors that used fleas and rats to transmit the
diseases. 218 These dispersal methods were meant to cause the most amount of harm and proved
useful in Germany during World War II with the use of tularemia.
Today, Russia still possesses stockpiles of this disease. Most of the once military-ran
facilities have been turned into civilian facilities for vaccine and infectious disease research.
These dual-use facilities have brought about a dilemma in the area of biodefense vs. compliance.
Like the other countries mentioned in this chapter, it is impossible to distinguish between
biodefense facilities and offensive bioweapons facilities as the materials needed for each are very
similar. Today, Russia still has access to a vast network of private biotechnology laboratories
that could eventually be used for biological weapons in the future.
Another threat that comes from the Russian bioweapons’ programs does not come from
the diseases themselves, but rather from the lack of security surrounding Russia’s biohazardous
facilities. A 2004 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicated that
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little progress was made in securing bioweapon facilities in Russia. 219 This is because it is
possible for terrorist organizations to break into current Russian biological facilities to steal vials
of disease to begin their biological weapons programs. This was especially true of Al Qaeda as
there were reports regarding a link between Al Qaeda and plans to steal biological agents from
Russia. Moreover, the exodus of biological scientists from Russia to other countries presented an
interesting opportunity for terrorist groups around the country to try and hire Soviet experts to
begin their biological weapons programs. In December 2001, Osama bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman
Zawahiri stated, “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in central Asia, contact any
disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available.” 220 So
while it might be hard to directly link Russia to the proliferation of biological weapons to
terrorist organizations, it isn’t hard to connect its ex-scientists to the same thing.
As for threat calculus, there are two actors that this section will look at for Russia, the
Russian government and the terrorist organization Al Qaeda. The above analysis has proven that
Russia has a useful biological weapons capability, but that is only half of the threat calculus,
their willingness to utilize biological weapons also must be realized. The same is true for Al
Qaeda.
Beginning with the Russian government, President Putin’s declaration in 2012 to look at
ways to build genetic weapons makes it clear that Russia is not shying away from the research
and production of biological weapons. While it is true that the Soviet Union’s use of biological
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weapons has backfired on it in the past, the threat of contamination is unlikely to stop a
determined adversary, and it is nonetheless possible that modern Russia would still be willing to
use biological weapons defensively and offensively if Putin felt it was to his advantage.
President Putin does not have any statements that outright declares his willingness to use
biological weapons, but given that biological weapons are considered WMD, it is beneficial to
look at his statements regarding other WMD. In December 2014, Russian President Putin
announced that under Russia’s military doctrine it “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its
allies, as well as in response to aggression against the Russian Federation that utilizes
conventional weapons that threatens the very existence of the state.” 221 This statement indicates a
willingness on the part of the Russian government to utilize nuclear weapons in any situation,
against enemies and allies, to achieve its objectives. It would not be a jump to say that if forced
to defend itself or to win a war, Russia may very well use biological weapons.
As for Al Qaeda, the goals of the organization must be looked at before a decision can be
made on the will of this organization to use biological weapons. Al Qaeda has spent nearly 15
years attempting to obtain WMD to launch a devastating attack against the United States. In
2002, Al Qaeda announced its goal to kill four million Americans. 222 This goal combined with
their desire for a weapon of mass destruction illustrates that the organization would be willing to
use biological weapons to accomplish their goals, so long as they can devastate the United States
in the attack.
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Summary
Throughout this chapter, it should have been made clear that biological warfare and
biological terrorism is a genuine threat that the United States is facing from state and non-state
actors alike. All over the world, capabilities are being researched, tested, and advanced to
improve the threat, while the United States makes limited efforts to improve its defenses. The
extent of the above programs should be enough to prove that not only do U.S. adversaries have
the capability to attack the United States, but they also have the will. It is time the United States
finds the will to defend against such capabilities.
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CHAPTER IV: INCIDENTS AND THREATS OF BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

Biological warfare is not a new concept, but rather as old as war itself. People have been
finding ways to manipulate natural diseases for their benefit since the 14th century B.C. The first
attempts at biological warfare were rudimentary at best, often utilizing the cadavers of the
infected to attempt to infect others. But as conventional methods of warfare progressed
throughout the years, so did biological methods until countries were not just weaponizing
cadavers but instead were weaponizing bacterial strands.
The purpose of this chapter is not to give a historical overview of some significant
biological incidents since the beginning of biological warfare, but rather to illustrate the
occurrences of biological warfare in history and showcase how devastating the effects can be for
the ongoing war. This chapter will go over six separate incidents and, in each episode, will look
at the period, the disease used, how it was transmitted, how many people were affected, what it
meant for the war then, and what it could mean for the United States now. This chapter is
intended to show that there is a precedent for biological warfare that only grows more realistic as
more time passes.

The Hittite Plague
During the 14th century B.C., a long-lasting tularemia epidemic started within the Eastern
Mediterranean. When traced to its source, it is theorized that the disease began in Canaan along
the Arwad-Euphrates trading route. 223 The infection started in Cyprus and spread naturally to
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Iraq, Israel, and Syria, but it spared Egypt and Anatolia due to quarantine boundaries. These
boundaries are what led to the first recorded use of pathogenic warfare.
By the 14th century B.C., the Hittites had conquered much of what is now Turkey, Iraq,
and Syria, creating an empire that was allegedly built due to severe biological warfare
techniques. Dr. Trevisanato, a molecular biochemist, claims that the Hittites battlefield successes
were due to their use of ‘cursed rams’ or tularemia-infected animals that were left outside cities
the Hittites desired to conquer. 224 Then, the city patrons would bring the contaminated animals
inside the city gates to breed or eat, thus instigating a spread of disease. Dr. Trevisanato says,
“There is no doubt that these were the first weapons of mass destruction. They were waging
bioterrorism.” 225 This instance, known as the Hittite Plague. 226
Initially, the Hittites sought to conquer western Anatolia to spread their empire further,
but due to quarantine and political boundaries, the Hittites had trouble securing the city. It was at
this point that the Hittites deliberately brought these ‘cursed rams’ to the town to infect their
Arzawan enemies. 227 The spread of tularemia ravaged the town, changing the favor of the war. In
a time, where modern medicine was a distant imagining, nearly 15% of all infected die and many
more suffered. The new epidemic changed the tide of the war, allowing the Hittites to claim
victory against the Arzawan, in a battle they should have lost.
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However, the use of biological weapons did not come without costs. Dr. Trevisanato
notes that just a few years after this attack, the Hittites recorded an epidemic within ranks, that
severely weakened their military, ultimately contributing to the fall of the Hittite empire. 228
Regardless of their limited success and eventual demise, this instance is what led the rest of the
world into an era of biological warfare. Today, leaving infected cattle outside city walls will not
have nearly the same effect, but even still the Hittites set a precedent that pathogenic warfare
may clear the path for a quick, almost effortless victory.

Swedish-Russian War of 1710
Thousands of years later, countries were continuing to use infected animals and even the
corpses of infected people to turn the tides in a war. In the 1700s, Russia declared siege upon the
Swedish-held city of Revel to spread its empire. However, the town of Revel was well-protected
and perfectly capable of holding steady during a prolonged siege, so the Russians had to find a
way to go around this issue. Their answer was biological warfare.
During the Swedish-Russian War of 1710, Dr. Thalassinou alleges that the Russians
disposed of the bodies of infected plague victims in a river that flowed into the Swedish-held city
of Revel to contaminate the water supply and spread the plague to make the siege more
successful. 229 This attack is thought to be reminiscent of the siege of Caffa during the Middle
Ages. During the siege of Caffa, the military leaders of Tartar used the epidemic to their favor by
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“hurling the cadavers of their deceased into the city… forcing a retreat of the Genoese forces.” 230
It is believed that the Russians followed Tartar’s example during the Swedish-Russian War of
1710 by catapulting bodies of plague victims into the Swedish-held city of Reval. 231 However,
more recently, it has also been alleged that the disposal of plague victims by the Russians may
have also been an intentional biological warfare tactic meant to spread the plague in Revel. 232
It is estimated by Danish historian, Karl-Erik Frandsen, that nearly ¾ of the 20,000
people in Revel died due to the plague outbreak, leaving the city vulnerable for the Russians
trying to conquer it. 233 In the modern age, it isn’t inconceivable that an enemy nation would
employ similar tactics to defeat their adversaries by using bodies or infected materials to spread
disease throughout their opponents’ ranks. This tactic was applied during the 15th century to
expedite the spread of smallpox.

Spread of Smallpox
Europe had a lot going for them when it began to colonize the new world. It had better
weapons, more advanced materials, and most interestingly, it had different pathogens. The
Native Americans that spread across both North and South America had never been exposed to
germs that were thought of as common in Europe. In the early stages of colonization, the Native
Americans worked hard to get along with the newcomers, but the colonizers were afraid that
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their cooperation would give way to hatred and eventually lead to a physical clash, so with them
they brought ‘Guns and Germs and Steel.’
In the 15th century, it was said that Francisco Pizarro and Sir Jeffrey Amherst, while
providing aid to the Native Americans in a burst of cooperation, intentionally provided Native
Americans with smallpox-laden blankets in hopes that the disease would spread and decrease the
possibility of hostility against the British. 234 A population devastated by disease is unlikely to
wage a war that they cannot win, allowing the British to colonize sought after land in an almost
effortlessly manner.
Today, the spread of smallpox across Native American populations is considered one of
the critical events that lead to the success of the European conquest over the Americas. The
unprotected community in newly found America was at a severe disadvantage against a disease
for which they had no immune system. While smallpox ravaged communities across the world at
this time, it seemed to ruin the Native Americans at an even faster rate. The PBS documentary,
“Guns, Germs, and Steel,” estimates that the disease, smallpox, brought to the Americas killed
an estimated 90% of Native Americans. 235 A once thriving population was reduced to shambles
by way of conquest by pathogens. While it may be true that more advanced weapons likely were
the main reason that Native Americans fell so quickly to invaders, the diseases that ravaged
populations in the New World played no small part.
This type of biological warfare, especially with a disease such as smallpox, is likely to be
the most devastating to the United States in the case of an intentional release. While smallpox

234. George W. Christopher et al. “Biological Warfare. A Historical Perspective,” JAMA
278, no. 5 (1997): 414.
235. “The Story of… Smallpox – and other Deadly Eurasian Germs,” Guns, Germs, and
Steel, 2005, https://www.pbs.org/gunsgermssteel/variables/smallpox.html.
78

vaccinations used to be a mandatory occurrence during the eradication of smallpox, the new
generations of the United States have been left unprotected since its elimination. The United
States stopped routine smallpox vaccinations in 1972. 236 According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
the United States population in 1972 was approximately 210 million compared to today’s
approximate population of 329 million people. 237 This means that there are approximately 119
million Americans unprotected against smallpox. Given smallpox’s fatality rate of 30%, an
intentional release of smallpox in this modern environment would likely lead to similar
devastation among Americans as it did against Native Americans in the 1400s, causing nearly 40
million deaths.

Second Sino-Japanese War
It was the level of destruction caused by smallpox in Native American populations that
led modern countries to develop more advanced and capable biological weapons programs.
Nations realized that soldiers are essential in waging and winning wars on both sides, so what
better way to get rid of people than to infect them with deadly agents that tend to look natural.
The Japanese took that thinking to heart during World War II. Beginning as early as 1930, Japan
created an entire department, called Unit 731, that was explicitly used to research and create
chemical and biological weapons for use in WWII. 238 The Unit was responsible for testing
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weapons and carried out consistent human experimentation on prisoners of war and Japanese
citizens to ensure the viability of their weapons.
However, it was during the Second Sino-Japanese War of the 1940s, that the Japanese hit
their peak with biological warfare. It is reported that the Japanese encased bubonic plague,
cholera, smallpox, botulism, anthrax, and other diseases into bombs that it repeatedly dropped on
the Chinese to win the war. 239 Around the same time, the Japanese considered dropping ‘flea
bombs’ on American populations but surrendered before the plan could be put in operation. If it
had been carried out, the flea bombs would have contained 90kg of plague-carrying fleas,
approximately 150 million insects in ten separate attacks. 240 The resulting infection would have
been devastating.
According to Daniel Barenblatt, the 2002 International Symposium on the Crimes of
Bacteriological Warfare, the number of people estimated to have died from diseases due to
Japan’s biological warfare was around 580,000. 241 If a similar attack had been carried out on the
United States, it is possible that the death toll would have been two to three times that much.
Today, ‘flea bombs’ are considered a more rudimentary form of biological warfare, as it
is harder to contain, but easy to deploy and usually quite effective. The United States must
remain in a state of constant vigilance to ensure that wayward planes or other transportation
devices are not used to infect American populations. A more modern, and likely example over
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flea bombs, would be using conventional trade routes for exports and imports, where U.S.
adversaries could try to export contaminated materials to spread disease and mayhem.
The above four examples have mostly focused on cases occurring outside of the United
States. However, the final two selections will showcase scenarios that bring this issue closer to
home.

2001 Anthrax Attacks
In what may have been the only successful biological attack against the United States to
date, the 2001 Anthrax attacks are often overlooked due to its proximity to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. However, this event is no less critical. Just one week after 9/11, anonymous letters began
arriving at media companies and congressional offices. Each letter contained a powdered form of
anthrax spores. 242 Within five months, five people will be dead, and 17 more will have been
infected, from a disease not present in the United States since the 1970s.
On October 5, 2001, Bob Stevens of American Media died from anthrax. It is classified
as the first anthrax death within the United States in over 25 years. Stevens death is followed by
the deaths of two postal workers from Washington DC, Kathy Nguyen, an employee of
Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital, and Ottilie Lundgren of Connecticut, who had no
actual connection to the rest of the deaths. 243 If the disease had been left unchecked, it is likely
that far more people would have died.
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But the impacts of the disease went far beyond the physical deaths. The American Media
Inc. building was quarantined for more than five years until it got the A-Okay by federal health
officials to reopen in 2007. 244 Along the same lines, the Brentwood postal facility took nearly
two years to reopen for public use and the renovations and cleanup of the facility cost roughly
130 million dollars.245 These economic impacts were devastating and caused by a relatively
small biological attack. Just imagine what a large-scale attack could due to the United States.
But in the case of the 2001 Anthrax attacks, fortunately for all that received letters or
encountered those people, anthrax can be treated with antibiotics if it is caught early enough, but
a surprise outbreak of a nearly eradicated disease within the United States will catch any hospital
by surprise and can lead to panic and slow containment methods. Today, the United States has
learned from these attacks by tightening postal protocol and stockpiling vaccines. Should the
2019 Anthrax attacks happen tomorrow, it is valid to assume that the United States is more
equipped to deal with the scenario than in the past.

Terrorist Cave Findings
Despite the increased preparedness against future biological weapons completed by the
United States in 2001, it did not stop United States’ adversaries from their desire to obtain,
weaponize, and deploy biological weapons against the United States in the future. With the rise
of terrorism in the Middle East and increasingly anti-American sentiment among these terrorist
groups, it should come as no surprise that the evidence was found indicating a possible future
biological attack against the United States by the terrorist group Al-Qaeda.
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In 2002, US Navy Seals found a list of pathogens in an Afghanistan cave that Al-Qaeda
could use as biological weapons. Unique about this discovery was that the pathogens were not
limited human pathogens. Six pathogens targeted livestock and poultry and four targeted
crops. 246 These findings not only indicated a willingness to use biological weapons, but also a
comprehensive plan on how to use them.
This discovery was also the first report of plans by a terrorist group to attack more than
just human populations. These plans seemed to show an increased sophistication among terrorist
groups that the United States had not been expecting. Terrorist groups could now not only plan
on decimating populations, but also economic centers. Cutting off the two biggest livestock
exports, cattle, and poultry, would be devastating for the United States economy and killing
crops at an expedited pace would be detrimental to most farms in the Midwest. While navy seals
managed to confiscate these plans in 2002, there is no telling what other plans terrorist groups
may have for 2019. The best the United States can do at this point is to prepare for anything, by
maintaining strict import/export controls, increasing prevention methods, and preparing for the
worse (as cliché as that sounds.) A biological attack of this nature would likely start small, but if
not caught in time could become nearly uncontainable.

Summary
These examples are just a few of many, where diseases were used to change the tide of
war. Since then, the methods of biological warfare have advanced, but the knowledge remains
rudimentary enough for non-state actors to access. Whereas the experience needed to create and
use nuclear weapons remains out of reach for most states and especially non-state actors, the
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knowledge necessary to manufacture biological weapons remains available on the internet. The
CDC says, “recipes for preparing homemade agents are readily available, and reports of arsenals
of military bioweapons raise the possibility that terrorists might have access to highly dangerous
agents, which have been engineered for mass dissemination as small-particle aerosols.” 247
Biological weapons provide a wealth of advantages for terrorists and states wanting to
inflict damage on the United States at a relatively low-cost. Bioweapons are inexpensive, can be
easily transported, stockpiled, and can cause more deaths than a tactical nuclear weapon.
Terrorist groups have also shown more interest in acquiring bioweapons than atomic weapons. A
laptop recovered from an ISIL hideout in Syria contained plans and instructions on how to
weaponize the bubonic plague. Later that same year, chatter on terrorist social media sites
discussed weaponizing Ebola and other pathogens as weapons against the United States. 248
Besides ISIL, Al Qaeda has also worked on plans to send groups of their members, called biomartyrs, into the West who would purposely infect themselves with a bird flu virus to spread the
disease around the world, by traveling on consecutive international flights. 249 Biological
weapons provide a relatively easy method to inflict a high human cost on enemies.
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CHAPTER V: BIOTERRORISM

While it is clear from previous chapters that biological warfare is not as uncommon as
one might think, the exact definition of biological warfare, especially regarding terrorism may
remain unclear. The purpose of this chapter is to breakdown biological warfare into smaller
subcategories to come away with a more well-rounded understanding of what biological warfare
means. To accomplish this feat, this chapter begins with the definition of biological warfare
before moving on to the definition of biological terrorism. Then to provide explanations using
examples, this chapter will offer a scenario that shows rather than tells what biological terrorism
is. Next, this chapter will cover agricultural biological terrorism in much the same fashion,
beginning with a definition and then an example.
However, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. This chapter is meant to define
biological terrorism and agricultural biological terrorism better, but it is also intended to explain
why terrorist groups would choose this method of attack over other methods and why they might
not. To this end, this chapter will analyze different reasonings for and against the use of
biological agents as weapons, allowing the reader to draw their conclusions to the utility of these
pathogens. Lastly, this chapter will explore the possibility of state-sponsored biological terrorism
to show the relationship between states with biological weapons programs and the terrorists
those states might support.

Biological Terrorism
Biological Warfare is defined by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) as, “the
intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs that can sicken or kill people, livestock, or
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crops.” 250 Any situation described in the historical section of this paper, aside from the 2001
anthrax attacks and the cave findings, would be an example of biological warfare as the instances
occurred between one state and another.
Biological terrorism or bioterrorism, on the other hand, would occur between a terrorist
organization and another party, be it another terrorist organization or a state, for a specific
purpose. The CDC defines bioterrorism as, “biological agents used as weapons to further
personal or political agendas.” 251 For example, in 2001, letters that contained anthrax spores
were mailed to several people in the United States, killing five and infecting 17 others. However,
given advances in technology, a modern-day biological attack could kill and affect many more.
A scenario described in the Blue-Ribbon Panel on Biodefense shows possible impacts,
Nine weeks ago, terrorists unleashed insidious biological attacks on our Nation’s Capitol
during our Independence Day celebrations. The infectious agent they used ultimately led
to the deaths of 6,053 Americans. Many of our colleagues and staff fell ill and died.
Thousands more were killed in coordinated attacks in allied nations in the days that
followed. The attack here in Washington, D.C. used aerosol delivery devices we could
see but did not know contained dangerous organisms. We discovered later that other
attacks had already begun elsewhere in the Nation, using methods we have yet to identify
that spread the disease among livestock in rural communities. Delays in recognition –
because most veterinarians and physicians had never seen Nipah virus – meant animals
and people were sick for more than a week before we realized what had happened. And
now we are being told that the virus, which in nature does not spread easily among
people, was genetically modified to increase its ability to spread from animal to animal,
animal to person, and person to person. 252
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This scenario accurately represents the effects a small-scale terrorist attack could cause to
the American populous. The longer the disease goes unchecked or uncontained, the further the
spread, and the more significant the impact. If a widespread, simultaneous bioterrorist attack
were to happen in multiple areas across the United States, the resulting effect would be
devastating domestically and abroad. It could become a pandemic the world has no chance of
containing.

Agricultural Biological Terrorism
When people think about the effects of bioweapons, they tend to think in terms of human
lives lost, but diseases can affect more than just humans. Biological weapons can be used to
attack agriculture and animals causing just as severe damage to the United States as an attack
against the population. While specific animal pathogens may not be enough to cause a
worldwide catastrophe, individual crop disease could be. Wheat and rice account for almost 40
percent of the world’s total calorie consumption. 253 An attack on multiple sources of the wheat
supply in the west or a rice supply in the east simultaneously could cause a significant disruption
in supplies that could in turn cause worldwide famine leading to potential starvation by millions
of people could occur.
Agricultural biological terrorism or agroterrorism refers to bioterrorist attacks on
livestock or crops. Rocco Casagrande, author of the article, “Agricultural Bioterrorism
(Agricultural Biosecurity, Agroterrorism)” defines agroterrorism as, “the intentional spread of

253. Daschle, “A Threat to the Food System.”

87

pathogens livestock or crops to cause economic harm.” 254 This type of biological terrorism is
markedly different from general bioterrorism as the target and goal of the attack differ severely.
Bioterrorism is for political means and generally targets human populations, while agroterrorism
attacks livestock and crops with the aim to cause economic devastation. However, despite these
differences, both types of biological terrorism can be destructive, and the threat of either one
holds the population and agriculture at risk.
The 2015 Avian influenza epidemic provides an excellent example of what an
agroterrorism attack would resemble in the United States. The Emergency Management website
describes,
Avian influenza struck Minnesota — the nation’s largest turkey producer — first, striking
hardest where turkey production was the dominant industry. It then jumped to Missouri,
then Arkansas, then north to Kansas and north again to South Dakota, defying the
migration patterns of the wild birds suspected of carrying the virus, before striking
Minnesota a second time. It sickened and killed both turkeys and chickens. In Iowa, avian
influenza struck a turkey farm first, then a huge egg farm with more than 4 million layers.
Before the outbreak subsided, 77 properties in Iowa were hit. Millions of birds were
killed, either by the virus or in the attempt to keep it from spreading. Across the country,
it had affected nearly 50 million birds in 21 states. 255
Although this outbreak had natural causes, experts from Emergency Management believe
this is what a bioterrorism attack would look like aimed at agriculture. It should be the goal of
the world to prevent any intentional spread of biological weapons. While the United States has
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created a new policy and contingency plans, it is likely not enough to combat a quick-spreading,
deadly biological attack.

Why Choose Biological Terrorism?
Historical instances of biological warfare are not hard to come by, but modern examples
are few and far between. Due to this discrepancy, it is essential for this chapter to contain a
section that explains why terrorist groups would choose to use biological agents as their method
of warfare. This section will go over many of the advantages of using biological agents during
terrorist attacks to provide solid reasoning for why biological terrorism is a viable threat against
the United States. The main advantages this section will cover include low cost and rudimentary
skills required, attribution problems, lack of protection in the United States, and most
importantly its potential for a high impact.
Biological agents provide terrorist groups with a low cost and relatively easy way to
make a weapon that has the potential to be felt around the world. Bioweapons are inexpensive,
can be easily transported, stockpiled, and has the potential to cause destruction worldwide.
Crystal Ayres, a war veteran turned reporter, writes ‘in a literal sense, anyone can create their
crude biological weapon if he had [the] flu and would leave samples of the virus in a container,
wherein he can manage to keep it alive over time.” 256 This indicates that anyone with access to
an infected person can put together a crude biological weapon design that could cause an
outbreak at a meager price. Tim Downs, an author and terrorism expert, says, “experts have
estimated that for a terrorist group to develop a nuclear weapon could cost them a billion
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dollars… But to develop a very good biological arsenal you would need about ten million dollars
and a very small lab and a master’s degree in chemical engineering.” 257 As stated in chapter 3,
there are many diseases that are no longer found in the United States but can still be found in the
Middle East. This means that terrorist groups in the Middle East could harvest contaminates that
the United States has not seen in years and released them to cause panic in North America for
nearly no cost.
However, low cost alone is not enough to entice terrorist organizations to give up their
dreams of obtaining nuclear weapons, but lower effort and knowledge requirements might be.
While the knowledge needed to create and use atomic weapons remains out of reach for most
states and especially non-state actors, the knowledge necessary to manufacture biological
weapons remains available on the internet. The CDC agrees stating that any person can find
instructions on how to make a bioweapon on the internet.” 258 This ease of acquisition makes
biological weapons an appealing option for terrorist organizations.
Another reason terrorist groups might choose biological weapons is due to how natural
‘intentional outbreaks’ can look and the resulting attribution problems. The pathogens used for
biological attacks are often naturally occurring agents over synthetically created ones. This
means a deliberate bioterrorist attack can be mistaken as a naturally occurring outbreak. To this
end, it would hard to attribute attacks to any one entity and as such terrorist organizations can
claim the credit on their terms. However, this only works when the disease already naturally
occurs in the United States. For example, an outbreak of avian influenza that affects the United
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States’ poultry may be classified as an unfortunate, but a natural incident. However, an outbreak
of smallpox in the United States would be immediately suspicious because the disease has been
declared eradicated for nearly 40 years and therefore would be immediately classified as an
intentional attack.
A second issue with this, however, would be attribution. While the United States may be
able to quickly mark an attack as natural or intentional, finding out exactly who or what
organization is responsible for the attack is markedly harder. Paula A. DeSutter, a former
Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, states, “Scientists must be
able to determine, first, what was the source of the event that caused the disease; second,
determine if the event was natural or deliberately caused; and third, be able to track down its
origins. That is an EXTREMELY difficult set of tasks.” 259 Attribution can be a hard task during
any event conventional or otherwise but attributing something that could have happened
naturally becomes even more challenging. DeSutter continues by explaining how air travel has
made attribution even harder. Someone can be in Washington D.C. one day and in Paris, France
the next. 260 Globalization has made attribution impossible at worse and challenging at best.
We can use smallpox as an example. If there was a smallpox outbreak in the United
States tomorrow, then it can be easy to assume that this outbreak is an intentional one and not a
natural one, but attribution can be tricky. While it might be smart to believe that the attack came
from Russia because Russia is the only other country besides the United States to have smallpox
officially, it is alleged that there are many other nations to have kept smallpox stockpiles from
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that the former Soviet Union gave to them before the end of the Cold War. This means that while
Russia is a logical answer, it is not the only one.
Another reason that terrorist organizations might choose biological weapons over
conventional ones is that they can be more effective. The United States has ramped up
protections against terrorism since the 9/11 hijacks; however, the United States still trails when it
comes to biodefense. The United States has continued to cut funding to biodefense even has the
new Administration boasts that its new Biodefense Strategy will protect the American people. 261
Dr. John Fischer, the director of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Chemical and
Biological Defense Division, stated that “the chemical-biological defense division is taking a cut
[of more than 28%] in the fiscal year 2018.” 262 The 2018 budget document listed several
programs critical to biodefense that are all facing budget restrictions including:
•

Biosurveillance systems to collect and exploit data

•

Reliable chemical detectors development

•

Development of repositories of biothreat agents that could be used for detection,
response, and recovery.
These programs are considered critical to a comprehensive United States biodefense. 263

Also facing budget constraints in 2018 is the Department of Defense (DoD) where military
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programs that develop chemical and biological countermeasures are seeing significant cuts to
their funding. James Dillman, the Director of Research at US Army Medical Research Institute
of Chemical Defense, states “[current] budget constraints have caused the organization to narrow
our focus in research opportunities.” 264 Budget reductions on programs that have proven an
effective defense against bioterrorism are damaging to the United States’ overall budget defense.
Even more worrisome is that the current United States’ health infrastructure remains
unable to respond to an attack. Using the Ebola crisis as an example, the United States showed
that it is not prepared to deal with a widespread biological attack. While Ebola was not a
biological attack, the situation does an excellent job of showing how the United States might
react to an intentional outbreak. Air Force Col. Randall Larsen says, “We can see how easy it
was to overwhelm one pretty good hospital in Dallas. If this is a sign of how well we’re prepared
for the big one, we’re in trouble.” 265 While there were only a couple of cases of Ebola during the
2014 outbreak, hospitals were quickly overwhelmed. If the United States has trouble containing
a small outbreak with advanced notice, it will likely struggle even more with an unexpected
intentional attack.
Without a comprehensive biodefense infrastructure, the effectiveness of a bioterrorist
attack increases. At this moment it is unlikely that terrorists could successfully attack the United
States by firing a missile at one of its cities. Not only does the United States possess a competent
missile defense layer, that includes ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska, ballistic
missile defense (BMD) capable ships stationed around the world, as well as short-range defense
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systems including the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Patriot air
defense system, 266 but the rockets that terrorists often have access to are frequently not powerful
enough to reach the United States. However, it is not nearly as hard for terrorists to infect their
people with contagious diseases and then put them on planes and have them fly back and forth
until they have affected hundreds of people on their way home to infect even more people
unknowingly. It is also possible for homegrown terrorists to use agents found in the United
States to affect farms by spreading agricultural diseases, like avian flu, across different poultry
farms until the United States has no choice but to slaughter entire populations of poultry to
contain the disease. This type of effect can often be extremely appealing to terrorists who want to
inflict damage at a high level with a relatively low level of effort.
Lastly, terrorists are likely to choose biological agents because of their high impact. In
this case, high impact is different from high effectiveness. Effectiveness refers to whether a
terrorist group could successfully carry out a bio- or agroterrorist attack against the United
States, while impact applies to the number of people infected, how badly agriculture was
contaminated, or how hard the attack hit the economy. Ayres says, “a single gram of agents, like
the botulinum toxin, used in a biological weapon can kill millions of individuals.” 267 However,
this impact only refers to diseases that affect humans. Diseases affecting agriculture can have
just as high of an impact on the United States. Carlton Gyles writes in his article
“Agroterrorism,” that
The effects of an act of agroterrorism might include animal suffering, loss of valuable
animals, cost of containment of outbreaks and disposal of carcasses, lost trade, and other
economic effects involving suppliers, transporters, distributors, and restaurants. The $1
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billion price tag on the dioxin-contaminated animal in the Netherlands in 2006 and the
$21 billion cost of the UK foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in 2001 illustrate the
potential economic impact of chemical contamination or infectious disease affecting
animals. 268
Targeting food sources in the United States could have spillover effects that later affect
the human population. Viruses that affect animals and produce often can also affect humans. The
viruses can spread between these three elements indiscriminately causing a prominent level of
disruption in the US. This is the type of impact that terrorist organizations tend to want when
they are planning an attack against their enemies. A tremendous economic or human loss sends a
message to any country opposing them that they mean business and are not afraid to use any
method necessary to accomplish their means.

Summary
These reasons are just some of the many advantages of using biological weapons as
opposed to conventional ones. However, like every method of warfare, there are also plenty of
disadvantages that may prevent terrorists from turning to pathogens to create a panic and
accomplish political goals. This next section covers some of the reasons that terrorists might shy
away from using disease and instead remain focused on conventional weapons.

Why Not Biological Terrorism?
Terrorist organizations have been around for years now, and most groups have, at one
point or another, expressed interest in obtaining and using biological weapons. However, no
terrorist group has yet to launch a biological attack against the United States. This does not mean
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that a bioterrorist attack is an impossibility; it just says that there are significant disadvantages to
using biological agents as weapons. This section will serve to analyze some of the reasons why
terrorist groups might not choose biological weapons, including the possibility of asymmetric
retaliation, possible ineffectiveness, general dislike, and maybe most important diseases are
uncontrollable.
Pathogenic warfare shares similarities to cyber and space warfare. All three seem to be
new domains in which fighting wars are becoming more and more possible. Now, if the United
States were attacked in space or over the internet, the United States might have more trouble
responding than it would to a conventional attack. This is not because the United States is
incapable of responding, but rather because there is not internationally accepted escalation ladder
for unconventional warfare. The same applies to bioterrorism. Since bioterrorism is a relatively
unused type of warfare, the world has not yet established a set escalation ladder for how to
respond to biological attacks. The lack of escalation ladder could lead to confusion among
victimized nations in how to respond and delay an appropriate response or prevent nations from
responding altogether.
Officially, the United States does not have a biological weapons program, so if its
population was attacked using pathogens, the United States does not have the option to respond
symmetrically as it would in the case of other types of attacks. Normally, if the United States
was attacked, it would respond in a symmetric fashion, but it cannot do that during a biological
attack. Instead, the United States would likely have to respond using an asymmetric form of
warfare, possibly an escalatory one. Dr. Edward Eitzen says,
A major disadvantage to the use of biological weapons is that, since they are
widely viewed as weapons of mass destruction and out of the ordinary, their use
may bring about the escalation of military conflict (i.e., in the type of a retaliatory
attack). Since there are no biological weapons in the current arsenal of the United
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States, and since the effect of chemical weapons is so much more limited in scale
and area covered, we can only speculate on the response of the United States if
our military forces or civilian populations were attacked with biological weapons.
Such concerns may be one reason why Iraq elected not to use chemical or
biological weapons in the Persian Gulf War. 269
The threat of retaliation, if an attack can be attributed, may be enough to act as a deterrent
for bio- and agroterrorism. However, some terrorist organizations may continue a path that uses
biological weapons because of the impact of a successful attack outweighs possible retaliation.
However, fear of retaliation is only one of many disadvantages of biological weapons. Another
reason counters a previous advantage of effectiveness. As with any attack, there is a chance that
biological weapons may not have the desired effect when used against adversaries. Pathogens are
live, active viruses and bacteria, which makes them inherently unpredictable. It is possible the
disease could die when released because of an inhospitable environment. However, it is possible
that it might not infect enough people or gain enough traction to spread prolifically. Research
even found that between 1 and 10 percent of the world’s population has a natural immunity to
many of the compounds found in biological weapons, which means that it is possible that the
disease may not even take depending on where the infection was supposed to start. 270 If terrorist
organizations want a ‘sure bet’ type of weapon, biological weapons are not the best choice.
Next, there is a possibility, albeit a small one, that international stigma may act as a
deterrent against the use of biological weapons. This is a strong argument when it comes to
recognized nations in the world, but substantially weaker when it refers to terrorist organizations.
Currently, the Biological Weapons Convention has 182 States Parties and five Signatory States.
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There are only ten states that have neither signed nor ratified the Convention. 271 This unity
signifies that there is an almost unanimous agreement that using biological weapons is
unacceptable.
However, terrorist organizations are unlikely to hold themselves to the same standard as
nations because they are not afforded the same status as nations are in the international order; it
is likely this unity will not matter to them. Still, global stigma can be a strong deterrent.
Bioterrorism and agroterrorism are usually done to accomplish a political goal, so it is possible
that terrorist organizations will hold their political purposes higher than their desire to cause a
large amount of destruction. Some organizations may be more likely to keep to international
standards because they desire recognition as a state, i.e., Hamas, or because they believe the
stigma will take away from their overall message. In this case, international aversion could serve
as an effortless deterrent.
Lastly, and possibly most importantly in deterring bio- and agroterrorism is
unpredictability. Biological weapons are not like conventional weapons. They are not one
explosion, one impact type of weapon. It does not just explode, cause damage, and then stops.
Pathogens are live bacteria and viruses that can continue to spread past the original target until it
becomes nearly impossible to contain. In the past, there have been examples of countries
attempting to use biological weapons to cause harm and instead causing outbreaks among their
troops, essentially providing instant karma to the attacker.
Science Clarified says, “Biological warfare is among the least commonly used military
strategies. Most military leaders have been reluctant to release microorganisms that might cause
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an uncontrolled outbreak of disease, affecting not only the enemy but friendly populations as
well.” 272 Even though there is plenty of terrorists willing to die for their cause, some terrorist
organizations’ goals are less in line with ‘total annihilation’ than others, so this uncontrollable
aspect of germ warfare might be off-putting to terrorist leaders.

State-Sponsored Biological Terrorism
Most of this chapter has been spent explaining and analyzing biological terrorism, but so
far it has lacked an analysis of state-sponsored biological terrorism. This section serves to
remedy that by describing what state-sponsored biological terrorism is, listing current states that
are designated state-sponsors of terrorism, and explain why some countries might choose to
sponsor terrorist groups by giving them the resources needed for biological terrorism.
The U.S. Department of State says that state-sponsors of terrorism are determined based
on whether they have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” 273 Very
simply put, state-sponsors of terrorism provide terrorist groups with money, weapons, or
recognition that allow those terrorist organizations to achieve more of their goals. States can also
use terrorist organizations as proxies to accomplish actions the state itself cannot perform
without severe consequences.
Currently, the State Department designates just four nations as state-sponsors of
terrorism: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, Sudan, and Syria. 274
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Of these four countries, this paper has covered three (North Korea, Iran, and Syria) due to their
biological weapons programs and dislike of the United States. During the analysis of their
biological weapons programs, it was explained what terrorist organizations each country might
support. In Chapter VI, descriptions of what a state-sponsored biological attack would look like
if it proved successful and productive will be provided.
However, just because a country does not make the list as an official state sponsor of
terrorism, it does not mean that that country does not support terrorism in its way. During the
Cold War, the former Soviet Union consistently provided support to communist nations and
rogue states that attempted to use attacks to accomplish their goals. To this day, modern Russia
continues to support organizations that could help achieve their political purposes and to stand
against the United States. In the next chapter, it will be shown how these countries can support
terrorist organizations and what that support might look like in the form of an attack.
But knowing that some countries support terrorism is far different from understanding
why they serve as supporters. Likely, the biggest reason that countries support terrorist
organizations is that it offers plausible deniability, while still helping nations accomplish their
defense and foreign policy objectives. For example, if Iran wants to make a move against Israel,
but due to international stigma and possible retaliation cannot make such a move, it could offer
to support a terrorist group that also wants to strike against Israel but may not have the resources
to do so. In this way, both the terrorist organization and the supporting nation can accomplish
their means. The terrorist organization acquires the resources needed to attack Israel, and Iran
can watch Israel suffer without leading the actual attack, giving Iran the ability to deny
involvement.
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Summary
Overall, bio- and agroterrorism are unfortunate threats that the United States needs to be
aware of to prepare for an attack adequately. This chapter was meant to give a better
understanding of what both bioterrorism and agroterrorism mean, explain what advantages and
disadvantages that biological weapons have for terrorists, and lastly explain what state-sponsored
biological terrorism means. This analysis is necessary to understand the next chapter which
provides imaginative biological and agricultural attack scenarios and what it would say for the
United States.
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CHAPTER VI: THE THREAT
Biological weapons, no matter how crude, are not just weapons of the state but have
become accessible to non-state actors as well. Rapid advances in medical technologies and the
relative simplicity of weaponizing biological agents have increased the bioterror threat.
Advanced degrees in biology are no longer needed to weaponize biological agents and actors do
not need exuberant amounts of money to create a program. The possibility of a biological attack
against the United States and its assets remains an unprecedented threat against the US that it is
not likely prepared to handle. A report from 2008 called World at Risk stated,
We accept the validity of current intelligence estimates about the current rudimentary
nature of terrorist capabilities in the area of biological weapons but caution that the
terrorists are trying to upgrade their capabilities and could do so by recruiting skilled
scientists. In this regard, the biological threat is greater than the nuclear; the acquisition
of deadly pathogens and their weaponization and dissemination in aerosol form would
entail fewer technical hurdles than the theft of production of weapons-grade uranium and
plutonium and its assembly into an improvised nuclear device. 275
The homeland boasts a population of over 300 million citizens and hundreds of thousands of
acres of agriculture. A successful attack that utilizes a disease with a high fatality and infection
rate against the United States has the potential to kill millions of people. For example, Bruce
Lee, an associate professor of international health at John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Health
estimates that since the smallpox virus alone kills approximately 1/3 of all infected people, it has
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the potential to kill 100 million people in the United States. 276 It is becoming increasingly clear
to the United States that it is under threat, not just at home, but abroad as well.
The United States has approximately 15,000 U.S. personnel based in Kuwait spread
among Camp Arifjan, Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base, and Ali Al Salem Air Base 277, about 5,000
found at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates 278, just over 200 at the U.S.
military base in Oman 279, 7,000 in Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet 280, and around
10,000 U.S. personnel at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar 281, which is considered one of the most
strategic U.S. air bases in the world. However, for this paper, we will only focus on the impact of
a biological attack on American assets in Bahrain and Qatar, given their large concentrations of
U.S. personnel and their proximity to potential adversarial actors.
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In the Asia-Pacific, the United States has nearly 28,000 military troops in South Korea
alone and an estimated additional 200,000 U.S. citizens living in Seoul, South Korea. As for
Guam, a second location in proximity to North Korea, there are nearly 90,000 American
Civilians and an additional 7,000 U.S. troops. 282 But human lives are not the only ones under
threat.
Biological weapons can be used to attack agriculture and animals causing just as severe
damage to the United States as an attack against the population. William Karesh, and advisor to
the Blue-Ribbon Study on Biodefense says, “The consequences of an agroterror attack would be
grave. It could be devastating to the economy because agriculture makes up 5.5 percent of the
country’s gross domestic product and employs 11 percent of Americans. It could cause food
shortages and even starvation.” 283 Any attack on the US agricultural sector could have
devastating economic, social, and political impacts due to the size of the farming industry, which
is why it should be the goal of the world to prevent any intentional spread of biological weapons.
While the United States has created a new policy and contingency plans, it is likely not enough
to combat a quick-spreading, deadly biological attack.
Biological weapons are likely to be chosen because of their propensity to do a lot of
damage. Past instances of disease pandemics have shown the world that pathogens, when
released on the planet, are worrisome. The impact of a biological weapon issued on American
assets in the Middle East has the potential to be devastating. Today, American soldiers lack

282. John Donnelly, “The Other North Korean Threat: Chemical and Biological
Weapons,” Roll Call, June 12, 2018, https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/the-other-northkorean-threat-chemical-and-biological-weapons.
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preparedness against a biological attack on bases in the Middle East. These attacks have the
potential to affect thousands of soldiers, directly and indirectly, affect millions of others.
The purpose of this chapter is to look at different scenarios where biological
contaminants could be used and how they might affect the United States. This chapter will look
at five unique situations that showcase the destructive power of biological weapons. The first
scenario will deal with a possible ISIS attack against American soldiers at the Naval base in
Bahrain. The second scenario will look at an Iranian attack utilizing anthrax at U.S. air bases in
Qatar. The third scenario will demonstrate a possible attack by North Korea on South Korea
using smallpox bacteria. The next situation would illustrate what an attack would look like by the
Taliban in Afghanistan if they got ahold of Chinese biological agents and dispersal materials.
The last scenario will represent what might happen if Al Qaeda used former Russian scientists to
develop agricultural viruses and released them on the United States cattle industry.

Bahrain and Tularemia
It had not taken much for the terrorist group, ISIS, to get ahold of a tularemia stockpile.
The civil war in Syria had left much of the laboratories unprotected, and easy pickings for any
brave person and ISIS had happened to send people there to get the job done. From there it was
not that hard to figure out where and how they wanted to spread the disease. The Naval base in
Bahrain was their first target. The station in Bahrain, which is shared by many countries, notably
the United States and Bahrain, was ripe with unsuspecting military personnel and potential
radicals. ISIS leaders had found foot soldiers willing to die for their cause already stationed on
the base. ISIS used the stockpile of tularemia to infect supplies coming into the base, including

105

things like linens and uniforms. It was a trojan horse, by the time the contaminated materials
were distributed, it would likely be too late.
However, the issue did not stop with the soldiers. ISIS leaders had planned the attack to
coincide with changes of personnel. Old soldiers were going home, and new ones were coming
on base. Every possibly infected person would bring the disease home with them as most
symptoms of tularemia are not detectable for nearly seven days after infection. 284 As soldiers
came and went, it became clear that something was wrong. As more and more people fell sick,
the world watched in terror as an eradicated disease ravaged the United States. Luckily the
United States keeps tularemia vaccines stockpiled for possible outbreaks and were able to
vaccinate the population, but by then the damage had been done. Thousands were dead and even
more still sick. The United States’ most strategic naval base in the Middle East was overrun by
contaminates, and the United States’ Fifth Fleet was without a home. The United States could
only ask how it had happened.

Qatar and Anthrax
Every day the United States-Iranian relationship worsened. Iran was constantly
threatening attacks and testing new missiles capable of reaching American assets in the Middle
East. Most notably at risk was the American Air Base in Qatar, where nearly 10,000 Americans
made their home each night. All it took was one more nasty tweet from President Trump before
the Iranians had had enough and planned an offensive attack where it would hurt the United
States the most. The Iranian government had several options including new missiles and
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chemical weapons, but Iran wanted a semblance of deniability and instead chose biological
weapons because they are naturally occurring.
Iran excels at creating bombs that can deliver microbes, so within days it had unmarked
planes and drones carrying the deadly virus anthrax to bomb on the American Air Base in Qatar.
The Americans tried their best, but their missile and air defenses were overrun, and multiple
planes got through to dump anthrax powder across the Air Base. Within a week, thousands of
people were infected, and hundreds were dying. The United States quarantined the base at once,
and vaccines were flown out to contain the attack, but unfortunately, pathogens are not always
constrained by normal means. The anthrax infection spreads beyond the base infecting
surrounding nations in the Middle East eventually causing a full-scale pandemic. Hospitals
across the area hurry to set up biohazard facilities to handle the infected, but the efforts are not
enough. Ultimately, the disease was contained, but not before it has killed hundreds of thousands
and infected many more. The Air Base in Qatar, one of the most strategic in the world, is
unusable for the time being and the United States is left in an unfortunate place strategically.

South Korea and the Plague
Going to South Korea had been a dream of yours since your grandmother first sat you
down and told you the stories of her ancestors and today your dream was finally being realized.
You had just become one of the 200,000 Americans living, working, and studying abroad in
Seoul, South Korea. The day had started like any other. You had woken up, gone to school, and
was now sitting outside going through flashcards to help improve your Korean when what
sounded like a small aircraft passed overhead. You looked up and could not believe your eyes.
Hundreds of mini-drones were flying overhead releasing what looked to be millions of small
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insects. Immediately, you took cover going back inside until you could get more information
about what was going.
Four days later, it was all over the news. North Korea had used hundreds of drones
carrying fleas infected with plague to launch a biological attack against South Korea due to
deteriorating relations between the two countries. The entire situation was like something out of
a comic book and reminiscent of what the Japanese had done to the Chinese during WWII. The
South Korean government had already declared a State of Emergency urging its populations to
be careful going outside and report to a hospital immediately if you began exhibiting signs of the
Bubonic Plague.
However, no amount of retrospective precautions could save the situation; within a
month hundreds of thousands of people were dead, including nearly 50,000 Americans and
Plague was spreading beyond country borders. What had once been believed to be another
surveillance drone incursion by North Korea, ended up being something far worse.

Afghanistan and Smallpox
The Taliban had been fighting for dominance in Afghanistan for years, and every time it
seemed close to a peace deal, something sabotaged their efforts. However, the Taliban had never
forgotten its original goal to run Afghanistan under Sharia law. With the rising threat of
biological attacks, the Taliban convinced China under pretenses of providing it with stockpiles of
the smallpox vaccine to protect its populations from possible future releases. The development of
synthetic horsepox in Canada became the primary justification for the Taliban’s desire to be
prepared, but their real reasons were far more nefarious.
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After receiving the vaccines, the Taliban did begin to inoculate their population, but they
also took the vaccine and began to separate the live virus from the vaccine to weaponize
smallpox for an infection. Just months later, their scientists had had a breakthrough, and the
Taliban had officially weaponized smallpox.
Early in the morning, during routine delivery of aid to the current government, the
Taliban quietly ambushed and contaminated the supplies before delivering them as scheduled.
The wait was agonizing, but within weeks of the initial infection government officials across
Afghanistan were exhibiting symptoms of a disease once thought to be extinct. An incapacitated
government made it that much easier for the Taliban to take charge, no more peace talks needed.

U.S. Cattle Industry and Foot-and-Mouth Disease
After years of searching, homegrown terrorists in the United States had finally found a
former Russian biological scientist willing to recreate the former Soviet Union’s weaponized
version of the foot-and-mouth disease. Due to a recent natural outbreak, it was not hard for the
scientist to obtain samples of the virus and by using a basic laboratory, he was able to make
small changes to the condition to make it more virulent. Once the virus was ready, Al Qaeda
leaders sent out these homegrown terrorists in small groups dressed as farmers to release the
disease on unsuspecting cattle populations across the country.
Starting in Kansas, the terrorist spread out staying in each place for no more than a few
days to ensure that the cattle herds were infected correctly before moving onto the next. At first,
the United States government did not even realize that anything suspicious was going on. The
United States government originally assumed that a past natural outbreak had spread, but then
cattle populations across the United States began to fall ill in a way that was entirely unnatural.
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The United States had to stop cattle exports until the outbreak could be contained costing the
United States billions of dollars in profits.
Once the United States finally contained the disease, it began searching for the culprits,
but by that time the terrorists were far gone, and Al Qaeda was taking credit. Maybe Al Qaeda
did not kill the four million Americans that it originally desired to, but it had done something
much worse. It had devastated the American economy in a way that could take decades to
recover.

Summary
These scenarios showcase the destructive capability of biological weapons if the United
States does not have a viable biodefense infrastructure in place. The threat of biological warfare
is no longer linear. The United States cannot just be worried about offensive biological weapons
program from enemy states but must also worry about dual-use research programs and
technology. The term dual use is most often applied to research that can be used for both civilian
and military purposes. For example, research into nuclear fission can be used for both nuclear
energy production and the production of atomic weapons. In the case of biological research, this
term can be used to include the research used by biomedical scientists to create vaccines for
highly infectious diseases but can also be used by enemy states to create weaponized versions of
the same disease. A highly publicized version of this was when a group led by David Evans at
the University of Alberta created a complete synthetic version of the horsepox virus to create a
better vaccine for smallpox potentially. 285 Synthetic biology is “a maturing scientific discipline

285. RS Noyce, S Lederman, DH Evans, “Construction of an Infectious Horsepox Virus
Vaccine from Chemically Synthesized DNA Fragments,” PubMed Central, January 20, 2018,
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that combines science and engineering to design and build novel biological functions and
systems. This includes the design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and as well
as the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes.” 286
However, the research was very controversial as many believed the reward of a new
vaccine for an eradicated virus did not outweigh the threat of an accidental release, or intentional
release (as the research was made public) of the virus on a largely unvaccinated public. Other
labs around the world have run into this exact ethical dilemma with other diseases. While
research into synthetic biology can be instrumental in creating new vaccines and possibly cures
for chronic illnesses, the risk of biological attacks increases, in the case of synthetic horsepox,
the research into how they made the disease was made public potentially allowing threat actors
to create their version of horsepox and maybe even smallpox. This creates a worrying situation
where the benefits must be weighed against the threat and research better protected or possibly
not done at all. In the words of Ian Malcolm from Jurassic Park, “Your scientists were so
preoccupied with whether they could, they didn’t stop to think if they should.” 287
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CHAPTER VII: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BIODEFENSE

Biodefense is defined by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) in
its biodefense report as, “plans to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological threats that
could have catastrophic consequences to the nation.” 288 It incorporates any infrastructure used to
defend against a biological attack, from stockpiles of vaccines at hospitals to tightened airport
security. The United States biodefense infrastructure spans across multiple agencies including
the DHS, the DoD, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS),
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 289 The National Institute of Allergies and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the CDC, and the Army also play roles in developing technologies
for biodefense.
In 2001, the DHS created the four essential pillars of national biodefense consisting of
Threat Awareness, Biosurveillance, Detection and Diagnostics, and Response and Recovery. 290
Each pillar covers different aspects of the biodefense infrastructure. Threat Awareness
“identifies, assesses and prioritizes chemical and biological risks and threats to enable planning,
response, countermeasures, and remediation.” 291 Biosurveillance prioritizes “developing
effective surveillance, prevention, and operational capabilities for detecting and countering

288. “Biodefense: Federal Efforts to Develop Biological Threat Awareness,” United
States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, October 2017,
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biological threats.” 292 Detection and Diagnostics focus on “developing tools to rapidly detect and
diagnose high-priority and emerging biological and chemical threat agents both in the field and
medical practitioners office as well as highly characterized microbe repositories for use in
validation studies.” 293 Response and Recover focus on “returning things to normal following a
biological attack.” 294 The Department of Homeland Security indicates that the United States is
making progress in all four of these areas, but leading research organizations around the country
including the WMD Terrorism Research Center and the Blue-Ribbon Biodefense Panel continue
to indicate that the United States remains vulnerable to attack.
For example, in an attempt to better gauge the United States’ readiness to respond to a
biological attack, the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center in 2011, led by former
Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, Colonel Randy Larsen, and Lynne Kidder, released its
“Bio-Response Report Card.” 295 The authors describe the report card’s purpose as to “provide a
strategic, end-to-end assessment of America’s bio-response capabilities.” 296 The report card
analyzes the United States’ abilities in eight separate areas of biodefense including Detection and
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Diagnosis, Attribution, Communication, Medical Countermeasure Availability, Medical
Countermeasure Development, and Approval Process, Medical Management, Environmental
Cleanup. For each area, the research center assigned a grade using a common school grading
scale:
A – Meets Most Expectations
B – Meets Many Expectations
C – Meets Minimal Expectations
D – Meets Few Expectations
F – Fails to Meet Expectations
Aside from assigning grades to each area, the center also indicates whether the trend for
that area is stagnant or improving.
Figure 1 below is the full Bio-Response Report Card:

Figure 1. Bio-Response Report Card that measures the United States readiness for different areas
of preparedness by assigning grades and then designating the current trend for predicted
improvement in that area. 297
297. Matishak, “U.S. Receives Poor Marks,” 7.
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The results were disheartening. While the United States received good ratings for its
response to small-scale biological attacks, its ability to respond to large-scale attacks and global
crises failed to meet expectations in most areas. The trends in this report card show that while
there have been some improvements, most areas remain stagnant.
Over the past ten years, biodefense spending has varied, but in the past few years, the
funding has trended downward. Table 1 below shows the breakdown of funding for specific
areas of biodefense from Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 to FY2019.

Table 1. Total Federal Civilian Biodefense Funding Over Eight Years (In Millions) 298
______________________________________________________________________________
FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015

FY2016

FY2017
(Actual)

FY2018
(Estimated)

FY2019
(Budget)

891.1

825.7

1,035.6

889.8

750.2

633.9

707.8

600.0

654.8

642.6

614.9

1,016.4

693.5

720.4

651.0

731.9

244.5

246.3

271.8

266.8

266.8

266.8

266.8

266.8

USDA
Total

0.0

26.0

27.0

31.0

32.0

38.0

38.0

15.0

NSF
Total

15.0

15.0

16.7

15.0

15.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Funding
Total

1,805.4

1,755.6

1,966.0

2,219.0

1,757.5

1,659.1

1,663.6

1,613.7

DoD Total
DHS Total
HHS Total

____________________________________________________________________________

The above table specifies that the spending in the budget for the DoD Civilian
Biosecurity Program has decreased by almost $100 million from FY 2018. More specifically,

298. Watson et al, “Federal Funding for Health Security,” 284.
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both the Medical Biological Defense area and the Biologically Based Material and Devices lost
nearly half their funding. The total Federal Civilian Biosecurity Program fared better, losing only
$30 million of funding overall. Other notable programs facing cuts are the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s biodefense program which lost an estimated 66% of its funding. These programs
are just a few of the many programs facing cuts. Within the USDA, the program losing most of
the funding is the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection program that is instrumental to diagnosing
and containing disease outbreaks in crops across the United States. The program within DARPA
that researches infectious diseases and containment methods also lost a significant amount of
funding decreasing the United States’ understanding of infectious diseases and how they spread.
While the Trump administration is confident that these budget restrictions will lead to
more efficiency among offices, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham called them “radical and
reckless and made without a plan.” 299
The current protections offered to the United States are not as complete or as integrated
as they could be or have been. This chapter is meant to provide some suggestions on how the
United States can increase its biological defenses or biodefense. These recommendations range
from more funding and; following previous panel suggestions, to mandated vaccines and
international cooperation. While this is not a comprehensive list of steps the United States could
take for more protection, it addresses a wide array of United States’ biodefense vulnerabilities.

Suggestions in the Blue-Ribbon Panel on Biodefense
In October 2015, the Blue-Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense put forth a report titled “A
National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts.”

299. Kirby, “The Trump Administration,” 385.
116

The Blue-Ribbon Panel on Biodefense is a privately funded organization that provides a
comprehensive assessment of the state of the United States’ biodefense efforts. The organization
also produces reports that offer recommendations to foster change in the area of biodefense. The
current panel includes Senior Counsel Joseph Liberman, Chairman Thomas Ridge of Ridge
Global, Senator Tom Daschle, Representative Jim Greenwood, the CEO of the Biotechnology
Industry Organization, the Honorable Kenneth Wainstein, and the Honorable Lisa Monaco. 300
The purpose of this report was to inform the government about different options for reforming
the leadership aspect of biodefense, including restructuring the current biodefense
infrastructure. 301 However, this was not the only report to be published by this Blue-Ribbon
Panel. Since 2015, the panel has also put forth reports with suggestions about the defense of
animal agriculture, increasing funding, and even reinforcements.
As a first recommendation, the United States could enact some of the suggestions present
in the multiple reports provided by the biodefense blue-ribbon panel to streamline overall
biodefense. Overall, the committee offers over 20 different recommendations dealing with all
aspects of United States biodefense. However, for this section, the focus will remain on
restructuring White House leadership for biodefense. The panel suggests reorganizing the current
biodefense structure to allow for a more coordinated response against biological threats. 302 One
possible answer would be to let the Vice President have administrative power over the
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biodefense budget and coordinated efforts. 303 Under this recommendation, there are two action
items: 1) Empower the Vice President with jurisdiction and authority and 2) Empower the Vice
President with budget authority. 304 The idea behind this change in policy is to restructure the
biodefense response architecture by creating a more top-down system. So instead of state
legislatures relying on individual reports of a situation, possibly leading to bad decisions in the
case of a biological attack, state and local leaders can instead look to the Vice President to dictate
important decisions like quarantines and emergency responses needed. By creating a clear chain
of command that could then direct response efforts, the United States stands a better chance of
containing and responding to a biological attack.
Another vital recommendation mentioned in this blue-ribbon panel deals with better
integrating federal resources and information with that of State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
(SLTT) governments. Due to the country’s current biodefense infrastructure, SLTT governments
must work to contain possible bio- and agroterrorist attacks by themselves until the federal
government can get assets on the ground to help contain an attack. However, the blue-ribbon
panel instead suggests “empowering non-federal entities to become equal Biosurveillance
partners by creating an interagency Biosurveillance planning committee” 305 increasing
cooperation and communication between the two entities to improve response time during a
biological attack. This empowerment gives the SLTT governments a voice in how each

303. “Holding the Line on Biodefense,” 34.
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municipality responds to biological attacks allowing a more effective overall response than if the
SLTT governments had to handle it on their own.
Switching gears to a more agroterrorism focused defense, the blue-ribbon panel on
‘Defense of Animal Agriculture’ suggests increased collaboration between the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The panel
suggests that law enforcement and health officials should conduct investigations into agricultural
disease outbreaks together to get a more well-rounded report on the contamination causes and
impacts. 306 Currently, investigations regarding animal health are handled by the USDA, while
the FBI acts as law enforcement in the case of an intentional attack. Since the FBI deems all
domestic incidents of foreign animal diseases suspicious, it keeps communication lines open
with the USDA. 307 However, as of now, both agencies conduct separate investigations; to
prevent or respond to a coordinated agroterrorism attack or even a biological attack against
humans; communication and collaboration are critical to ensuring all entities involved in the
containment and response are on the same page and working towards the same goal. Increasing
cooperation between the USDA and the FBI is just one way of improving overall collaboration
during a possible biological attack.

Increased Funding

306. “Defense of Animal Agriculture,” Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel
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One suggestion that may seem too obvious is also an essential suggestion in this section,
increasing funding. As mentioned before, the DHS’s Chemical and Biological Defense Division
faced a 28% budget decrease in 2018. 308 Researchers at the John Hopkins Center for Health
Security estimate that the 2019 proposed budget would cut funding for health-security programs
by an additional 4% or nearly $636 million. 309 These cuts would affect five critical categories of
health security including biodefense, radiological and nuclear defense, chemical defense, natural
outbreak and emerging infectious disease defense, and general preparedness, likely increasing
the United States’ vulnerability to biological attacks.
However, it is not just civilian agencies that are affected by these budget cuts to
biodefense. Also facing new budget constrains is DoD military programs focused on developing
chemical and biological countermeasures. James Dillman, the Director of Research at US Army
Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, states “[current] budget constraints have caused
the organization to narrow our focus in research opportunities.” 310 Crystal Watson, a senior
scholar at the Center for Health Security and lead author on the Health Security report for the
proposed FY2019 federal budget cuts, broke down the programs most highly affected by the
proposed cuts. Biosecurity programs are focusing on prevention, preparedness, and response to
intentional attacks on civilians, accidental releases of diseases, and natural outbreaks. Programs
dealing with Radiological, Nuclear, and Chemical security were also facing cuts between 2% and
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6%. Programs focused on general preparedness and increased health infrastructure to increase
the United States capacity to respond to large-scale attacks are being cut by seven percent. 311
Budget reductions on programs that have proven an effective defense against bioterrorism are
damaging to the United States’ ability to protect its population at home and abroad, including its
deployed military personnel. But it is not just specific programs that are suffering.
The blue-ribbon panel on budget reforms explains how the domestic public health
emergency funding is also in a sad state. “In 1983, Congress appropriated $30 million for the
fund, an amount insufficient to address a public health catastrophe. Congress has not explicitly
appropriated any money for the public health emergency fund since 1993. [As of February
2018], only about $57,000 remained,” the report reads. 312 The same reports suggest that not only
does the United States need a substantial infusion of funds into the Public Health Emergency
Fund, but that it also requires a rapid response fund that can be used in advance to preempt a
suspected significant problem, like increasing infrastructure required to handle an attack. The
report estimates that $2 billion would be a good baseline for the initial fund. 313 The money could
then be used by multiple entities to prepare the United States for an attack.
In terms of increasing funding, the United States should first begin with the
recommended two-billion-dollar infusion into the Civilian Biodefense Fund. First, a portion of
this money, approximately $76 million, should be used to rebuild the Public Health Emergency
Fund. This infusion would bring the fund back up to the level it was in 1983 when it was first
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created, while also accounting for the inflation rate from then until now. Seventy-six million
dollars would provide the United States the same purchasing power today as $30 million would
have provided the United States nearly 40 years ago. The rest of the money should be used to
fund a Rapid Response Fund that would provide the United States with new health infrastructure,
like the construction of more biosafety level 4 hospitals and better detection systems in public
areas.
Increased funding for biodefense remains the single most important recommendation for
increased biodefense. By increasing funding, you are providing the lead parties in biodefense the
ability to decide what vulnerabilities need to be addressed first. Increased funding could serve as
the difference between the United States reacting to a biological attack and proactively
preventing one.

Vaccinations (Stockpiled and Mandates)
A third suggestion would be stockpiling and mandating vaccines. Smallpox was
eliminated worldwide because of mandated vaccines and, up until recently, measles and polio
were nearly unheard of in the United States due to vaccinations. However, one erroneous report
about a connection between vaccines and autism could serve to reverse all the progress made by
increased inoculations. Just this past week, the State of Washington declared a State of
Emergency because of a continued measles outbreak in the southwest. 314 Already 30 cases have
been reported among unvaccinated children. State data shows that “only about 77 percent of
Clark County kindergarteners had completed their vaccinations for the 2017-2018 school year,
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down from 91.4 percent in 2004-2005. Experts say roughly 95 percent of people should be
vaccinated to create “herd immunity” against a contagious disease like measles.” 315 Peter Hotez,
a professor at the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, called the event “awful and really
tragic and totally preventable.” 316 One way to prevent situations like these would be returning to
the smallpox era where vaccines were mandatory. Mandating vaccines, except in cases where the
vaccine might cause irreparable harm due to a possible allergy, could be the solution needed to
decrease the effectiveness of a biological attack in the United States. A vaccinated population
could also serve as a deterrent for potential biological terrorist groups.
As well, the United States also has options to protect our troops in the Middle East
against biological attacks. As noted before, those serving in the Middle East are likely at a higher
risk because of their proximity to many of these terrorist organizations. The United States has
many different options it could implement to make the Middle East safer for its soldiers. The
first would be to make vaccinations for smallpox and anthrax mandatory for all soldiers stationed
abroad. Currently, the United States mandates certain vaccines for soldiers, like yellow fever and
typhoid, but it does not mandate the smallpox vaccine or the anthrax one. Instead, those two
vaccines are put under special circumstances and used only if the United States suspects a valid
high-level biological warfare threat in the area.
The Department of Defense immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense
specifies that “personnel assigned or scheduled for deployment to a high-threat area should be
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immunized against validated biological warfare threat agents for which suitable vaccines are
available.” 317 This means that for soldiers to be preemptively vaccinated, there must be a proven,
validated threat. However, it is nearly impossible for the United States to prove the existence of
an offensive biological weapons program in any area because, as mentioned before, biological
warfare infrastructure and commercial biotechnology infrastructure look identical. In this way, it
would be nearly impossible to prove the existence of a valid, imminent threat to justify
vaccinating soldiers. So, the United States should instead inoculate all soldiers before they are
deployed abroad to protect them from potential threats beforehand instead of trying to cure them
after the fact.

Increasing Infectious Disease Research
Epidemiology or infectious disease remains an ever-changing field of study. When the
United States thinks it is prepared to defend against known diseases worldwide, new diseases
like Ebola or the Zika virus appear, reminding the world that when the weapon can mutate at
will, the research never ends. To combat these ever-changing diseases, it is essential that the
United States dedicates more resources to researching how and in what situations diseases
mutate to better prepare the United States for handling biological attacks. Research into mutating
disease can also show the United States how its adversaries might attempt to mutate pathogens to
make them vaccine resistant, meaning that the United States has a chance to reverse engineer a
new and more effective vaccine against the virus.
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Currently, the United States only spends $478 million on antimicrobial resistance
research as opposed to the $525 million spent in past years. 318 Antimicrobial Resistance refers to
“the ability of a microorganism like bacteria, viruses, or parasites to stop an antimicrobial like
antibiotics, antivirals, and antimalarials from working against it.” 319 The research into
antimicrobial resistance is essential to the United States’ ability to combat diseases that its
adversaries may have mutated to be more effective against countermeasures like vaccines. While
monetary funding is decreasing, resistant diseases are increasing. Dr. Viera Scheibner, a scientist
and author from Blackheath New South Wales (NSW) Australia, studies how diseases adapt and
mutate to new vaccines. She says that diseases like B. pertussis, measles, and Haemophilus
influenzae have all shown the ability to adapt, evade, and combat vaccines. 320 While Dr.
Scheibner is referring to mostly natural adaptations, diseases can also be intentionally mutated by
scientists in adversarial nations. For this reason, the United States should increase funding for
antimicrobial resistance from its current $478 million to the previous level of $525 million. The
extra funding can be used specifically for creating vaccines better suited for combating drugresistant forms of highly infectious diseases.
But increased research is not limited to diseases that affect humans. Research is also
useful for defense against agroterrorism, like creating plants that are less susceptible to
pathogens that could devastate the United States economy. For example, the producers StarkBros

318. “Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and Disease Categories,”
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, May 18, 2018,
https://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx.
319. “Antimicrobial,” World Health Organization, November 2017,
https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/en/.
320. Viera Scheibner, “Speeding New Antibiotics to Market: A Fake Fix,” The BMJ 350,
no. 1: (2015), https://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h1453/rr-12.
125

have created disease-resistant apple trees that are less likely to be infected by citrus targeted
diseases. 321 Along the same lines, the South Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station has
experimentally bred a new type of winter wheat that not only provides higher yields, but it is also
more disease resistant compared to other kinds of grain. 322 The more research that done to
understand this topic, the better the likelihood the United States has of preventing or responding
to an attack.
However, a lack of funding and international oversight can limit the good that
international development labs can do to help protect against biological attacks. In some cases,
scientific developments can make the risk of bioterrorism higher. For example, this past summer
a Canadian research lab revived horsepox. They intended to use this revived virus to treat cancer
or develop a smallpox vaccine; however, Dr. Tom Inglesby worries that the direction and
publication of this research will lower the barriers to synthesize smallpox, one of the world’s
only eradicated diseases creating many international biosecurity and biosafety risks. 323 While
this research could lead to vaccines for diseases, it also opens the world to possible bioterrorist
threats using these diseases. The possibility of a bioterrorist threat seems to be increasing.
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Increased Detection Technologies
But increased research does not just come in the form of vaccines and disease-resistant
agriculture; it also comes in the form of more efficient detection methods. Since 9/11, the United
States has upgraded entry protocols in and out of military bases and airports, meaning that our
soldiers in the Middle East are more protected than they were ten years ago because they are
more aware. However, the soldiers checking for possible biological agent breaches have often
not been adequately trained on what a bioagent would look like and what to do if the found
evidence of a possible bioagent from someone entering United States’ property. 324 Security may
have increased, but because of insufficient technology, it is not capable of protecting against a
biological attack. 325 But the United States detection layer doesn’t just rely on humans looking for
signs of a possible attack; it also relies on the technology used in high traffic areas that can pick
out air contaminants.
Unfortunately, detection also remains in stasis. In 2014, the DHS terminated a contract
with NVS Technologies out of ‘convenience’ for the federal government. NVS Technologies had
been six months away from delivering a prototype of an inexpensive, portable device that could
quickly and accurately analyze air samples from current nationwide sensors to determine if they
contained pathogens. 326 The original hope was that this cheap, handheld device could improve
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and eventually replace the current bioterrorism attack detection system, BioWatch. Since 2001,
BioWatch has cost the US government over $1 billion in funding, takes up to 36 hours to analyze
potential pathogens, and has falsely warned of dozens of biological attacks. 327 As of 2017,
BioWatch continues to be the nation’s only line of detection against bioterrorism.
Due to the relative failure of BioWatch, it is highly recommended that the United States
invests in better detection technologies. To accomplish this, it would be beneficial for the United
States to look towards private companies for new and unique detection devices. New investments
could include but are not limited to looking into re-establishing the DHS contract with NVS
Technologies for small and portable detection devices to replace the current system. Spurring
private and commercial development for biological detection devices is a great way to increase
competition and ensure that the United States has the best options for protecting its citizens.
Early detection of the presence of infectious disease could be vital to getting the medical
countermeasures needed on site promptly. It also allows the United States to quarantine the area
and remove personnel to contain the spread of the disease. Technology allows for a more
sophisticated approach to fighting infectious disease spread. The same technology that enables
terrorists to weaponize and engineer new diseases can be used to contain and respond to
biological attacks.

Creating an International Oversight Committee
In general, the United States could also increase international cooperation on disease
research. While current efforts are working on this, lack of international oversight of these efforts
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increases biosecurity risks. The United States has a unique opportunity to head an international
oversight committee to regulate how infectious diseases are used in research and further protect
the United States from biological attacks. Utilizing scientists from across the world, the United
States could create an international organization that would lead to research on infectious
diseases and possibly leads to finding a cure. The organization could be a subset of WHO or an
entirely separate organization, but its focus could be to study infectious diseases and discover
ways to stop their spread and cure them.
Creating this international oversight committee also prevents countries from entering an
internationally sponsored organization for researching infectious disease for weaponization. The
United States severely limits itself by relying only on itself for research breakthroughs and
prevention methods. The United States has a chance to access an entire worldwide network of
scientists that could prove to be the best in their respective fields, searching for cures and better
vaccines a worldwide one. Not only would an organization like this give the United States a
chance to control the situation at an international level, but it would also allow the United States
access to the best and the brightest of the infectious disease world. International cooperation is a
much-needed addition to the United States’ current policy.
As well, the United States could work with the Middle East Consortium for Infectious
Disease Surveillance (MECIDS) to detect and control disease outbreaks in the Middle East
where many of its troops are currently stationed. MECIDS is a regional collaboration created to
improve detection and control of infectious disease outbreaks among Middle Eastern nations and
the neighboring countries of Jordan, Palestine, and Israel. It began as a foodborne disease
surveillance program but has grown to include avian flu detection as well as other highly
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infectious diseases. 328 This organization gives the United States a ready-made network of
detection devices that it may be able to use for its protection, however, because of its relative
newness the United States has yet to begin cooperation efforts with the group. It has a perfect
example of how the United States does not have to do everything themselves, but instead, it can
access networks that are already set up for the same reasons. Not only is this an excellent alliance
maintenance tactic, but it also provides better biosecurity to soldiers in the area.

Increasing Overall Health Infrastructure
Lastly, the United States could expand current health infrastructure to ensure that a
biological attack will not too quickly overwhelm hospitals, forcing them to send patients
elsewhere or off base. The United States military hospitals need to be biohazard level five ready
to adequately be prepared to protect soldiers in the time of a crisis. If the United States had
trouble containing a small EVD outbreak with advanced notice, it would likely struggle even
more with an unexpected intentional attack.
Containing a biological attack requires specific resources to house and treat infected
persons. Currently, there are only four United States’ Biocontainment Hospitals that are built
specifically to handle infectious disease:
1. National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland
2. Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia
3. University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska, and
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4. Saint Patrick Hospital in Missoula, Montana. 329
During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, these four hospitals acted as the first line of defense
against the Ebola virus. The purpose of these specialized containment units is to contain patients
that could cause a devastating pandemic, however, even with all four facilities working at full
capacity there are only 22 rooms to hold highly infectious patients (25 if the rooms at Saint
Patrick Hospital are doubled up), they have no hope in containing a widespread highly
contagious disease. 330 As the only biocontainment facilities in the United States, outbreaks in
parts of the country where these hospitals aren’t operating remain unprotected without facilities
to rely on in the case of an epidemic. Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious
Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, says, “They serve as the very
foundation in the U.S. for fighting highly infectious diseases. They have the best equipment, the
right protocols, and the properly trained personnel to confront diseases for which most other
hospitals would be unprepared.” 331 This indicates that a high majority of hospitals in the United
States are woefully unprepared to handle the influx of patients a biological attack could cause.
The current breakdown of biocontainment ready hospitals leaves the southwest region of
the United States without a facility to handle an attack. For these reasons, it is crucial that the
United States government builds up its health infrastructure to better handle possible future
biological attacks. This should start by providing funding and incentives to hospitals that put the
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effort in to build new biocontainment units and attend infectious disease training to prepare those
hospitals better. To begin, the United States should specifically fund a biocontainment hospital in
Texas, so that there is at least one biocontainment hospital per region of the United States. It
costs approximately $15 million to construct a level 4 biocontainment unit, a relatively small
cost compared to the overall amount of money spent on biodefense each year. 332 After the
construction of a biocontainment unit hospital in Texas, the United States should work towards
adding at least one additional biocontainment hospital in each region to handle better any future
attack that the United States might face. A rate of one new hospital every two years is
recommended as each unit takes about 18 months to complete. 333 As well, increasing health
infrastructure would also mean that the government needs to be able to provide these
biocontainment units with the materials that are necessary to fight outbreaks, like vaccines, antiviral medicine, and antibiotics. The United States has a population of over 300 million; it is high
time the United States has the health infrastructure to match.

Summary
The United States is at a turning point in its biodefense. The world is watching as the
United States shifts its focus from terrorism back to an era of Great Power Competition, allowing
efforts against terrorism to become a secondary priority. But while the United States may view
terrorism as a secondary priority, it should not be considered a less critical threat. Today, the
United States is woefully unprepared for a bio- or agroterrorism attack, but by implementing the
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above solutions, it is possible to reverse current vulnerabilities and set the United States on a
better and safer future path.

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION
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The goal of this thesis is not to destroy hope or provide a bleak and spooky outlook on
the world of biological terrorism; instead, this thesis is meant to educate the public on what
biological terrorism looks like and what the United States can do to limit and contain the
potential effects of a biological attack. To this end, this conclusion serves dual purposes; to wrap
up the overall goal of this thesis and offer a place to discuss its limitations.
First, in Chapter II, this thesis explored potential biological agents state and non-state
actors might use as biological weapons against the United States, but the list provided is in no
way comprehensive. The pathogens chosen in this Chapter were selected based on their potential
for destruction and based on the Category A, B, and C pathogens located on the CDC website.
Moreover, in Chapter III, it should be known that the six countries I chose to analyze and
use as possible state-sponsors of biological terrorism are not the only countries in the world with
alleged biological weapons programs. They are not even the only countries accused of
supporting terrorist organizations worldwide. These six nations were chosen because of the
amount of information available to support allegations of their biological weapons programs and
due to their mutual dislike of the United States as this dislike makes the possibility of them
supporting biological attacks against the United States more realistic.
As for Chapter IV, the history provided in this chapter is but a small selection of
biological attacks that have happened over the years. Due to page restraints, this chapter was not
in any way meant to provide a comprehensive history of the use of biological weapons, but
instead, it showcases that there is a precedent of using biological weapons in battles dating all the
way up to the 2000s. It was meant to show that biological weapons are still a wartime possibility,
unlike obsolete weapons, e.g., bayonets.
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Chapter V, which provides definitions of common terms and the advantages and
disadvantages of biological weapons is meant to be mostly explanatory and factual, but terrorist
organizations are historically unpredictable and because of this fact it is impossible to honestly
know what advantages and disadvantages might deter them from carrying out a biological attack.
Along the same lines, the list of pros and cons is not comprehensive but serve as the most
compelling advantages and disadvantages for this thesis.
In Chapter VI, this thesis explores the impact and threat of a biological attack using
imaginative scenarios. It should be noted once more how this thesis calculates the risk of an
attack, by analyzing the capability and intent of entities to conclude the likelihood of a biological
attack. In most cases, this calculous provides that a biological attack is a low risk but high impact
scenario. The same applies to most instances of the use of WMD. The imaginative scenarios are
based in fact that takes how diseases spread, future outbreaks of disease, and areas of attack into
account to extrapolate what a future intentional outbreak could look like but are still imaginative
scenarios and that diseases remain an unpredictable and uncontrollable weapon, which could
lead to a very different type of impact than the one indicated.
Lastly, Chapter VII provides multiple possibilities for policy changes that would better
prepare the United States but like in other chapters this list is in no way comprehensive. There
are hundreds of things that could be done by the United States to help prevent a biological attack,
but this chapter explores the policy recommendations that had the potential to be the most
impactful for thwarting an attack and those that were also part of the Blue-Ribbon panel on
biodefense that was explicitly put together to provide these suggestions.
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These limitations are not meant to invalidate this thesis, but rather provide more context
on the limitations of this thesis and even indicate that a longer book could be written to expand
on some of these limitations.
At this point let us return to the scenario presented on page one.
It has now been one year since the biological attack that changed the course of the United
States’ policy. No longer were people afraid to walk outside or turn on the news. No longer did a
cough make you a pariah, nor did the appearance of a boil indicate a death sentence. And yet,
there was still a sort of unease that lingered. The United States population was still more aware
than ever that they were vulnerable. The government had changed its course. The government
restored biodefense funding and incentivized technological advances for detection devices.
Children everywhere were being vaccinated for diseases once thought eradicated in the United
States, and hospitals stockpiled vaccines at an unprecedented rate. The United States would
never again make the mistake of believing it was invulnerable to pathogens. It is possible that no
amount of preparation could have prepared them for the 2019 Bubonic Plague attacks, but the
United States was learning from their mistakes and never again would it be caught unprepared.
Biological warfare might still get the best of the United States, but it should never be said that
the United States is going down without a fight.
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